EXHIBIT B

Case 23-50939-CSS Doc 7402 Filed 12/18/23 Page 2 of 135

		Page 1
1	UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY	COURT
2	DISTRICT OF DELAWARE	
3		
4	In re:	:
		: Chapter 11
5	ENERGY FUTURE HOLDINGS	:
	CORP., et al.,	: Case No. 14-10979(CSS)
6		:
	Debtors.	: (Jointly Administered)
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10		United States Bankruptcy Court
11		824 North Market Street
12		Wilmington, Delaware
13		December 16, 2015
14		9:43 AM
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21	BEFORE:	
22	HON CHRISTOPHER S. SONTCE	fI
23	U.S. BANKRUPTCY JUDGE	
24		
25	ECRO OPERATOR: LESLIE MU	JRIN

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1	HEARING re Status Update: Executory Contract and Cure
2	Dispute Issues
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4	HEARING re Stewart Claims Objections
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6	HEARING re Debtors' Fourteenth Omnibus (Substantive)
7	Objection to Certain No Liability Claims.
8	
9	HEARING re Debtors' Thirty-Third Omnibus (Substantive)
10	Objection to Substantive Duplicate and No Liability Claims
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12	HEARING re: Motion for Application of Federal Rule of
13	Bankruptcy Procedure 7023 and to Certify A Class Pursuant to
14	Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.
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25	Transcribed by: Sonya Ledanski Hyde

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Page 7
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   MONTEMAYOR & MONTEMAYOR
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         Attorney for Mr. Stewart
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    BY: CHARLES MONTEMAYOR
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16
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19	ERIK SCHNEIDER	
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23	MATTHEW UNDERWOOD	
24	KEVIN M. VAN DAM	
25	APARNA YENAMANDRA	

	Page 9
1	FOTEINI TELONI
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6	PROCEEDINGS
7	CLERK: All rise.
8	THE COURT: Please be seated. Excuse me. Good
9	morning.
10	MR. HUSNICK: Good morning, Your Honor. Chad
11	Husnick from Kirkland & Ellis LLP appearing on behalf of the
12	Debtors. Your Honor, I we have a fairly short agenda this
13	morning but a couple of things we would like to knock out.
14	Your Honor, first on the agenda is a relates to
15	an order that Your Honor has already entered and that is on
16	the 2016 insider compensation motion. We did agree with the
17	TCEH first lien ad hoc group that we would read an agreed
18	statement into the record. So if I may, I'm going to read
19	that statement into the record.
20	THE COURT: Yes.
21	MR. HUSNICK: Throughout this case, the various
22	boards have worked to operate the business and maximize
23	value while also making efforts to preserve optionality for
24	the future owners. With the entry of the orders approving
25	the DGA that is the Dlan Support Agreement the settlement

and the plan, we now know that the TCEH first liens will be the future owners of TCEH regardless of whether the current plan goes effective or we need to resort to an alternative plan.

As a result, the TCEH first liens have requested increased access to management at the operating levels of TCEH during the gap period between confirmation and the effective date so that the TCEH first liens can hit the ground running once TCEH emerges from bankruptcy.

In response to that request, the TCEH board has agreed to give the TCEH first liens increased access to management at the operating levels in the business and has committed and looked forward to working with the TCEH first liens to positively position the business and its cost structure to adapt to changing market conditions and its emergence from restructuring.

The Debtors stipulate that nothing in the proposed order that Your Honor entered yesterday will prevent the new board of reorganized TCEH after emergence from bankruptcy from enacting whatever compensation plans they deem appropriate to meet their new business plans subject to limitations in the plan, the settlement and confirmation orders and the plan support agreement regarding current compensation plans and employment agreements. That concludes the statement.

Page 11 1 THE COURT: Okay. 2 MR. HUSNICK: Your Honor --3 THE COURT: Hang on, Mr. Husnick. MR. HUSNICK: Pardon me? 4 5 THE COURT: Hang on. Someone wants to be heard. 6 MR. HUSNICK: Sure. 7 MR. ADLERSTEIN: Thank you, Your Honor. Jacob Adlerstein, Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison on behalf 8 of the ad hoc committee of TCEH first lien creditors. 9 10 following up on Mr. Husnick's remarks, I want to thank the 11 Debtors, their professionals and their management for agreeing to work with our clients to finally reposition the 12 13 TCEH business during this trying time. 14 We very much look forward to working together with the Debtors on this critical endeavor. As you've heard many 15 16 times before, the TCEH Debtors are facing significant 17 headwinds which have had a substantial impact on their 18 financial performance. Just by way of example, the TCEH first lien debt has traded down by nearly \$10 billion since 19 20 the petition date and natural gas prices are currently under 21 \$3 dollars. 22 As the future owners of reorganized TCEH, the ad 23 hoc committee of TCEH first lien creditors is very focused on acting swiftly and aggressively to meet these challenges. 24 25 We look forward to working correctively with the company to

Page 12 1 identify and implement changes prior to emergence that will 2 maximize the company's value and we appreciate very much the company's commitment to work with us in this regard. 3 4 you. 5 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 6 MR. HUSNICK: Thank you, Your Honor. 7 takes us to the agenda. Just as a quick preview, Your 8 Honor, if it's okay with you, we had proposed to proceed in 9 the following way. First we would hear a short up status 10 update for Your Honor on the executory contract and cure 11 dispute issues that we identified on the agenda. 12 of it's been adjourned but we wanted to give Your Honor an 13 update of what we're doing to try to narrow those objections because there's a lot on the docket related to that -- those 14 15 issues. 16 Then we'll turn to the Stewart claims objections 17 and then last we will have the motion of the unmanifested 18 asbestos plaintiffs for a -- to appoint a class representative and authorize the filing of a class proof of 19 20 If that order works with Your Honor, that's what we 21 would proceed with. 22 THE COURT: That's fine. 23 MR. HUSNICK: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor. And I turn the podium over to Ms. Emily Geier from Kirkland. 24

Thank you. Good morning, Ms. Geier.

THE COURT:

MS. GEIER: Good morning, Your Honor. Emily Geier from Kirkland & Ellis appearing on behalf of the Debtors.

I'm here this morning like probably Chad Husnick said to give a brief update on the contract assumption and rejection process and where it stands today.

Cumulatively through the process, the Debtors have assumed nearly 7000 contracts and rejected approximately 100. The Debtors have paid or plan to pay \$55 million in care costs but the overall effort has generated about \$400 million in savings to the Debtors. Specifically through the plan supplement, the Debtors assumed approximately 2800 contracts and rejected approximately 75. The Debtors will pay the \$44 million in cure costs related to those plan contracts on the plan effective date.

The Debtors received 11 formal objections or reservations of rights and approximately 45 informal inquiries from creditors. As reflected in Exhibit Z to the amended agenda, the Debtors have resolved the vast majority of those objections. As of today, only four contract objections remain outstanding and as Your Honor is aware, the confirmation order provided that any outstanding contract objections would be heard at today's hearing.

The Debtors and the four objecting parties have agreed to further adjourn those objections to the January Omnibus hearing. We don't believe that there's any

	Page 14
1	substantive disagreement on the issues. It's just
2	additional time to reconcile our records and the party's
3	records and confirm the cure amounts. The Debtors expect to
4	have those objections resolved before the January 14th
5	hearing.
6	Additionally, two contracts remain on
7	THE COURT: I'm sorry. I'm just interrupting you
8	briefly so that it's being continued to January 14th?
9	MS. GEIER: Exactly, the January Fourteenth
10	Omnibus hearing.
11	THE COURT: Just give me a moment.
12	MS. GEIER: And I can give you the names of those
13	objections.
14	THE COURT: That's okay. I just want to double
15	check that everything's correct with regard to our records
16	on that being a hearing date. Okay. That's fine. That's
17	listed as starting at 9:00, by the way. We won't start at
18	9:00. We'll start that hearing at 10:00.
19	MS. GEIER: That sounds like good news.
20	THE COURT: Yeah. I don't know why it's on at
21	9:00.
22	MS. GEIER: Okay. And additionally two contracts
23	remain on the Debtor's amended conditional assumption list.
24	We removed the majority of those contracts. They've either
25	been aggumed or one wag moved to the reject ligt. The

Page 15 1 parties and the Debtors are finalizing the terms of those 2 two amended agreements. 3 We've reached an agreement in principle on each of 4 them and hope to enter into those amended agreements before 5 the January 14th hearing. 6 So updates for those two conditional assumptions 7 and the resolution of the remaining cure objections will be 8 reflected in an amended plan supplement that we'll file 9 before that hearing or other filings as necessary with the 10 Court. Your Honor, I'm happy to answer any questions you 11 may have, otherwise... 12 THE COURT: No, I have no questions, thank you. 13 MS. GEIER: Great. Otherwise I will yield the podium to my colleague, Aparna Yenamandra, to address the 14 15 next item on the agenda. 16 THE COURT: Okay. 17 MS. GEIER: Thank you. 18 MS. YENAMANDRA: Good morning, Your Honor. Yenamandra from Kirkland & Ellis on behalf of the Debtors. 19 20 Your Honor, the next item on today's agenda is the Debtor's 21 Fourteenth Omnibus objection to claims as it relates to 22 proof of claim number 5739 for an unliquidated amount and 23 10003 for \$1.8 billion and the Debtor's Thirty-Third Omnibus 24 objection to claims as it relates to proof of claim number 25 10982 for an unliquidated amount.

Your Honor, we understand that on the original agenda that was filed for today's hearing, we listed the first two proofs of claim as they relate to the Fourteenth Omnibus objection but inadvertently failed to list the third proof of claim as it relates to the Thirty-Third Omnibus This was remedied on the amended agenda and just so Your Honor's aware, Kirkland sent an email to the claimant and her representatives and agents, which I'll provide more color on in a moment, on Monday morning before the first agenda was filed indicating that the claims for the Fourteenth and Thirty-Third Omnibus objection would be up today pending further word from them, which we did not receive. And additionally, the one claim on the Thirty-Third objection relates to the same basis for liability as the first two objections. So we'd like to go forward on all three.

THE COURT: That's fine.

MS. YENAMANDRA: All three of these proofs of claim were filed by Ms. Kukja Stewart who received notice of Your Honor's order establishing a customer claims bar date in her capacity as a former customer at TSU Energy. Your Honor may have seen that Ms. Stewart's counsel of record Mr. Seitz withdrew his notice of appearance recently, which I can provide more color on.

This means that Ms. Stewart is pro se. We do not

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Page 17 1 believe that she is here today. We understand that her son, 2 Mr. Kenneth Stewart and his purported agent, Mr. Marco Montemayor, are here today. Your Honor, neither Mr. Stewart 3 or Mr. Marco Montemayor are attorneys. Mr. Stewart has 4 never filed a proof of claim and we're a bit unclear on the 5 6 capacity in which they speak today but we understand they're 7 here and we're happy to give them their time subject to Your 8 Honor's allowance. 9 THE COURT: Mm hmm. MS. YENAMANDRA: So what I would propose, Your 10 11 Honor, just to bring some order to this presentation, is for the Debtors to first kind of provide a brief overview of the 12 13 claims, including the items that Mr. Stewart and Mr. 14 Montemayor filed on the docket and then, second, the process 15 the Debtors undertook before and after filing the claims 16 objection as information floated to, for lack of a better 17 term, quadruple check that. They had no relationship to the 18 allegations or liability based on the proofs of claim. At that point, the Debtors would yield the podium 19 20 to Mr. Stewart and/or Mr. Montemayor if they so desire and 21 we'll (indiscernible) with rebuttal if needed. 22 THE COURT: All right. MS. YENAMANDRA: Your Honor, the Debtors filed the 23 Fourteenth Omnibus claims objection on April 2nd, 2015, 24 25 years are important in this case, at Docket number 4050 and

the Thirty-Third Omnibus claims objection on October 16th,
2015 at Docket number 6499.

Each claims objection was supported by a declaration from Mr. Steven Kotarba. Mr. Kotarba is in the Courtroom today and serves as a managing director at Alvarez & Marsal, the Debtor's restructuring advisor. His declarations were docketed at Docket numbers 4051 and 6501 respectively. I have copies of Mr. Kotarba's declaration if Your Honor would like to see them.

THE COURT: No, I have them

MS. YENAMANDRA: Additionally, the Debtors

conducted additional searches of their books and records

based on information received from Ms. Stewart, Mr. Stewart,

Mr. Marco Montemayor and Mr. Seitz prior to his withdrawal

as counsel. If called to testify about these additional

searches, Mr. Kotarba, who is a senior member of the

Debtor's claims evaluation team would testify that, first,

Ms. Stewart's discovery request included specific references

to persons, entities and over 50 property records, almost

all of which covered the same parcel of land, which is 1800

Hunter Ferrell Road.

As a baseline matter, the only identifiable land parcel in Ms. Stewart's discovery request, again, 1800

Hunter Ferrell Road, is in Irving, Texas. Now, although TXU leases office space in Irving, the land in question is 10

miles from the company's closest operations. The property's in the streets of Hunter Ferrell Road and TXU's operations do not overlap or intersect at any point.

The Debtor's investigation led by the Debtor's claims evaluation team related to the discovery request built upon the earlier investigation and involved, among other things, a review of multiple internal software systems including the mining and counting system maintained by Luminant Mining's Real Estate Group through which it is possible to review all the co-leases to which any company entity is a party as well as the company's residential customer payment system which, again, Ms. Stewart received notice of the party in her capacity as a former customer, so she would have been included in that search.

Second, a review of hardcopy books and records maintained by the Debtor's land department; third, a review of Dallas County property records; and, finally, general internet searches.

These results found no documents indicating that EFH has any ownership or leasehold interest in the property described in Ms. Stewart's discovery request, no indication that EFH has any operations that touch the property, no documents indicating any relationship between Ms. Stewart and EFH and no other documents that were responsive to the request in any way.

Page 20 1 Your Honor, at this time, I'd like to move both 2 Mr. Kotarba's written declarations and his proffered testimony into evidence. 3 THE COURT: Any objections? It's admitted. 4 5 MS. YENAMANDRA: Thank you, Your Honor. 6 MR. STEWART: I object. 7 THE COURT: Sir, if you're going to participate in 8 the hearing, it would be helpful if you were at counsel 9 table, not in the back of the Courtroom. 10 MR. STEWART: Well, I have a counsel with me. 11 THE COURT: Well, then why don't you approach? 12 MS. YENAMANDRA: Again, Your Honor, we're not 13 aware of Ms. Stewart having counsel, but we will yield the 14 podium as necessary. MR. STEWART: This is Charles -- I need to 15 16 clarify. Marco Montemayor is not here today. My counsel, 17 Charles Montemayor from Dallas is here today. 18 THE COURT: All right. And you're Mr. Stewart, 19 for the record. Yes, sir. 20 MR. MONTEMAYOR: With the Court's permission, Your 21 Honor, I'm here, Your Honor, because Mr. Stewart has asked 22 me to try to comply some part with the order of the Court in 23 view of the fact that counsel that was in this case has withdrawn as of this week. And we don't know whether or not 24 25 he has submitted all of the information that we had sent to

Case 23-50939-CSS Doc 2492 Filed 12/18/23 Page 22 of 135 Page 21 1 him to submit to the Court. So I am new. I haven't had an 2 opportunity to meet counsel on the opposing counsel and I haven't had a chance to talk to Mr. Seitz who was on this 3 4 case. And I have information primarily to the fact that 5 6 Mr. Stewart here wants to submit information to substantiate 7 the fact that the properties that have been testified as not 8 sufficient enough to prove the proof of claim that he has 9 submitted to the Court. And that's the main thing that Mr. 10 Stewart now asks the Court for that opportunity, Your Honor. 11 THE COURT: Okay. Well, I'm certainly going to 12 allow Mr. Stewart to be heard either individually or through 13 you, but to put some focus on what we actually are dealing 14 with presently, the question specifically at this point was, 15 was there an objection to the admission of the declaration 16 of evidence and the proffer of evidence that was just made 17 to the Court and was there any objection to its admission 18 into evidence. 19 MR. MONTEMAYOR: Yes, Your Honor. 20 THE COURT: You certainly can cross examine the That's not an issue. Obviously you have a right 21 witness.

witness. That's not an issue. Obviously you have a right to cross examination, but we're dealing with the direct evidence.

MR. MONTEMAYOR: Yes. Mr. Stewart has invited me to say that he's objected to the presentation regarding

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Page 22 1 that. 2 THE COURT: And do you know the basis? MR. MONTEMAYOR: He would have to explain it, Your 3 Honor. Like I said, I haven't had an opportunity to talk to 4 5 Gary Seitz regarding the attorney in this case who just 6 withdrew the case. 7 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Stewart, what's your 8 evidentiary basis for objecting to the evidence? 9 MR. STEWART: They haven't done their due diligence. I have the documentations that I actually 10 11 submitted in the proof claim at the very beginning and I 12 have a list of easements that go across our properties. THE COURT: All right. Well, that's something 13 that you can address in cross examination of the witness. 14 That doesn't go to whether the actual evidence submitted is 15 16 admissible and obviously whatever you do in cross would --17 might affect the weight or that the Court would give to the 18 evidence that's already been admitted, so I'll overrule the objection to the admission of the evidence, so the 19 20 declarations and proffer are admitted into evidence. 21 I'd like to -- before I open up, Mr. Kotarba --22 fair enough -- to cross examination, I'd like the Debtors to 23 finish their presentation. So if you'd have a seat, sir, and we'd yield the podium back to the Debtor's counsel and 24 25 she can finish her presentation and then if you wish to

Page 23 1 cross examine the witness I'll make him available. 2 MR. MONTEMAYOR: Thank you, Your Honor. 3 THE COURT: You're welcome. 4 MS. YENAMANDRA: Thank you, Your Honor. With the inclusion of Mr. Kotarba's proffered testimony and his 5 6 declarations, we've made the bulk of our direct case. But 7 it's probably helpful to provide some context before we put 8 Mr. Kotarba on the stand. 9 THE COURT: Okay. MS. YENAMANDRA: So starting from the beginning, 10 11 the -- Ms. Stewart filed three proofs of claim. In some 12 instances, Mr. Stewart signed the proof of claim but in all 13 instances Ms. Stewart was listed as the claimant. Again, the first one was filed before the bar date for an 14 15 unliquidated amount. The second one was filed after the bar 16 date purporting to amend the first proof of claim and was 17 for \$1.8 billion. 18 The first proof of claim is the one that included 19 a cover note from Mr. Charles Montemayor, a Texas counsel, 20 and I'll note that that proof of claim was filed October 21 20th, 2014, so these are hardly new allegations that we're 22 discussing today. 23 Both proofs of claim were based on the same set of 24 alleged facts. First, that the Debtors owned or controlled 25 certain land parcels; second, that certain mining activities

occurred on the land parcels which gave rise to mineral rights that the Stewarts assert an interest in; and third, that the Debtors, again, own or control some sort of transmission mines or pipelines that Ms. Stewart asserts she owns or asserts that she otherwise has an interest in.

Before filing the Fourteenth Omnibus claims objection which relates to the first two of the three claims, the Debtors conducted a search of their books and records and found no connection between either the land reference and the proofs of claim, the alleged operations on the land or any connection to the transmission lines or pipelines.

The Debtors separate and apart from their investigation of their books and records also reviewed the materials appended to their proofs of claim in great detail and, again, found nothing to suggest the Debtors were connected to the land, the operations, the transmission lines or the pipelines.

To give Your Honor a flavor of the appended materials, which we have a copy of if you'd like to see them, they consisted of title insurance certificates, descriptions of various properties, the zoning reports and a timeline of events related to the sale and purchase of the land parcels.

Nothing in the timeline evidences any kind of

relationship between the land and the Debtors. Nothing in the land descriptions or the title certificates demonstrate that the Debtors have ever had any kind of relationship to the properties or the operations at issue.

Consequently, based on both their independent review of their books and records and the materials submitted by Ms. Stewart with her proofs of claim, the Debtors filed the Fourteenth Omnibus objection objecting to proofs of claim 5739 and 10003 on the basis of no liability.

Following that filing, a few things happened. Ms. Stewart retained the law firm of Geller Scali Busenkell & Brown LLC to represent her interests. Mr. Gary Seitz of that firm registered a notice of appearance with this Court in connection with that representation on April 30th, 2015 at Docket number 4361.

Second, Ms. Stewart filed a third proof of claim.

Mr. Stewart signed it but, again, the claimant was listed

as. Ms. Stewart alleging liability on the same basis as the

first two proofs of claim and adding new unfounded

allegations regarding fraud on certain of the Debtor's

prepetition equity holders.

Mr. Seitz, the counsel of record, did not sign the proof of claim and neither he nor his firm appear anywhere on the proof of claim.

Third, Mr. Stewart and what I'll refer to as his

Page 26 1 agent, Mr. Marco Montemayor, filed a number of papers on the 2 docket at Docket number 5384, 5716, 6101 and 6934 and submitted various materials to Kirkland. 3 THE COURT: Can I interrupt for a moment. Can you 4 5 give me the docket number again? I'm sorry, for the notice 6 of appearance. 7 MS. YENAMANDRA: Yes, 4361 was the original notice 8 of appearance and the withdrawal was at Docket number 7343. 9 THE COURT: Okay. I'd like to look at those, just 10 give me a minute, 7343? 11 MS. YENAMANDRA: Yep. Your Honor, I can provide some context around the filing of the -- the timing of the 12 13 filing of the withdrawal. 14 THE COURT: All right. Just, before you get that, 15 I just wanted to look at it, so just give me a moment. 16 That's what I thought it was. Is Mr. Seitz present or 17 anyone from Geller present in court? All right. I hear 18 nothing. Give me just a moment. All right. Sorry to 19 interrupt. You can proceed. 20 MS. YENAMANDRA: Thank you, Your Honor. So as I noted, following the filing of the Fourteenth Omnibus 21 22 objection, Mr. Stewart and Mr. Marco Montemayor filed a 23 number of materials on the docket, submitted various materials to Kirkland, again, kind of continuing on the 24 25 theme that we saw with the first two proofs of claim.

These materials continued to reference actions taken by entities with no relationship to the Debtors, to name a few AT&T, Verizon, Allstate Insurance, Edison International, Gifco Properties and (indiscernible) as well as claims related to land parcels with no relationship to the Debtors, again, 1800 Hunter Ferrell Road, which is one of the few identifiable land parcels mentioned, which again sits roughly 10 miles from the closest company operations.

These submissions of materials that make various allegations but do not show any liability on the part of the Debtors continued up until this morning when Mr. Montemayor filed a statement of facts identifying -- it's unclear whether it's Ms. Stewart or Mr. Stewart as a major interest holder in TXU and Edison International as it relates to the solvency of Oncor. This is at Docket 7369.

Your Honor, candidly, we don't know the basis of these allegations. We'll let Mr. Stewart speak for himself but, again, it seems to ride the theme of the first two proofs of claim where there's nothing showing any liability on the part of the Debtors.

To date, neither Ms. Stewart, who is the only actual claimant here who has filed a proof of claim, nor any of her representatives or agents have actually filed a response to the Debtor's claims objections and consequently the Debtors did not file a formal reply.

Instead, based on the materials we received, informal communications between the Stewarts, their agents, their representatives and the Debtors and cognoscente of the Court's time and resources, the Debtors agree to adjourn the claim's objections to, one, hopefully develop a consensual resolution and, two, again, quadruple check what we knew to be true from our first review of our books and records, that we had no relationship to any of the allegations in the proofs of claim.

Before I quickly touch upon the quadruple check that we did, we wanted to make clear that Mr. Ken Stewart has not filed any proofs of claim. It has not been made clear to the Debtors whether he believes he has any claims separate and apart from the ones filed by his mother.

If he does, those claims have never been properly asserted or filed with the Debtors or filed on the claims register, excuse me, and we would seek to expunge those claims on the same basis as the claims asserted by Ms. Stewart.

So very quickly to run through what the Debtors did to review the proofs of claim and appended materials, we of course rechecked our books and records, confirmed independently there was no relationship to the land, the mining operations, the transmission lines or the pipelines. Second, members of the Debtor's legal team both in-house and

at Kirkland engaged in telephonic and in-person meetings with Mr. Marco Montemayor, who professed to be the agent for Mr. Stewart, to understand the asserted claims. These did not result in the production of any additional material from any one purporting to act on behalf of the Stewarts evidencing a relationship between their claims and the Debtors.

Third, and this will provide some context around the withdrawal, Mr. Seitz served certain discovery requests on the Debtors asking the Debtors to produce any documents that relate to leases, easements or agreements between the Debtors and the Stewarts or between the Debtors and the parcels of land identified in the proofs of claim.

We did another search of our books and records and found no relationship. We did also kind of going above and beyond the call of duty, did an online search for a sample of the document request and our results fall into three buckets. Some of the references yielded no results at all. Some of them referenced -- some of them yielded results but showed no relationship to EFH. For example, we found a mortgage to Stewart and Susan (indiscernible) who we have no reason to believe had any connection to Mr. Kenneth and Ms. Kukja Stewart. Another result was a deed grant from Ms. Stewart to a company that we understand the Stewart family formed several years ago.

And then finally many of the results showed no relationship between the land and the Stewart family. For example, there is a 1986 deed from Las Colinas Corporation to Woodrow and Co. and an assessment of non-payment of homeowner fees from a Mr. Robert (Indiscernible), again, basically nothing showing a relationship to the Debtors or in some instances even to the claimant.

After providing these results to Mr. Seitz, Mr. Seitz withdrew as counsel and that notice of appearance as I mentioned is at Docket 7343.

So in sum, Your Honor, Ms. Stewart and to the extent he asserts any of his own claims based on the same allegations, Mr. Stewart, have not alleged facts sufficient to support legal liability and we commit that these proofs of claim are invalid on their face.

The Debtors have undertaken an exhaustive search to confirm they have no relationship to the Stewarts, the land parcels at issue, the mining operations, the transmission lines, the pipelines or any of the mine and lease agreements that are referenced in the proofs of claim and for this reason, Your Honor, we would ask that you expunge the claims.

At this time, we'll turn the podium over and reserve for rebuttal as necessary, unless Your Honor has any questions.

THE COURT: I don't have any questions. I want to take a very short recess, though.

(Recess)

CLERK: All rise.

THE COURT: Please be seated. All right, well, we have a problem in that Mr. Seitz has purported to withdraw without notice to the Court, without motion and without a court order. And under our local Rule 9010-2(b), if you have a matter pending before the Court, which he does, and you are not substituting an attorney admitted before the bar, which he has not, your representation continues until the Court says it doesn't.

I've tried to contact Mr. Seitz directly and got his voicemail. As far as I'm concerned, he's in contempt of court by not being here at a noticed hearing and I'm not willing to proceed right now without counsel for Mr. Stewart who knows something about what's going on in this case, since the one he brought obviously doesn't, before the Court so we can have a substantive discussion of the merits with proper representation of Mr. Stewart.

So we're going to continue for the minute or the time being this matter until I can hopefully reach Mr. Seitz or someone can reach Mr. Seitz and get him in court where he belongs and we can have this matter addressed on the merits. And we will take the bar date motion or, excuse me, the

Page 32 1 class group claim motion. 2 Don't anybody go anywhere. We're going to address this today one way or the other. But hopefully we'll be 3 able to contact Mr. Seitz and get him here. I know he's 4 5 generally not in the Delaware office. He operates out of 6 Philadelphia, so I'm not sure exactly how this will work, 7 the nuts and bolts of it. 8 So Mr. Stewart, we're going to hold off. All your 9 rights are reserved. You'll get your opportunity to speak 10 hopefully through Mr. Seitz or at least I'll be able to 11 question Mr. Seitz about what exactly is going on and then 12 we'll figure out how to proceed. 13 So if you could have a seat back in the gallery 14 again, they will hold your matter for the time being and we'll move on to the class proof of claim matter. 15 16 I think Mr. Hogan's here. I see him in the 17 gallery. 18 MR. HUSNICK: Your Honor, before we move on, Chad Husnick from Kirkland & Ellis. I had one counsel for the 19 20 EFH indentured trustee asked me -- they're in the Court 21 today and I believe they'd like to be excused. There was an 22 order filed under certification of counsel last night. 23 Unless Your Honor had any questions and we didn't have a formal presentation on that order. 24 25 I thought we were going to -- I

THE COURT:

	Page 33
1	thought doing that was going to avoid him having to travel
2	was the whole point you asked for permission to file the
3	CNO.
4	MR. HUSNICK: That's correct, Your Honor. So
5	unfortunately we because it wasn't entered we had him
6	down here.
7	THE COURT: Right.
8	MR. HUSNICK: But I want to just follow up and
9	make sure.
L0	THE COURT: All right. I've signed that order, so
L1	Mr. Pedone, you can get back on a plane.
L2	MR. HUSNICK: Thank you, Your Honor.
L3	MR. PEDONE: Thank you, Your Honor.
L4	THE COURT: You're welcome. So let's take the
L5	next matter.
L6	MAN: Your Honor, may I be excused?
L7	THE COURT: Yes, Mr. (indiscernible).
L8	MAN: Oh, thank you. Happy holidays.
L9	THE COURT: You, too, sir. I'm going to get you
20	to shave that beard off, Mr. (indiscernible).
21	MAN: (Indiscernible). Thank you.
22	THE COURT: You're welcome. Mr. Hogan?
23	MR. HOGAN: Good morning, Your Honor.
24	THE COURT: Good morning.
25	MR. HOGAN: Daniel Hogan of Hogan McDaniel on

behalf of the punitive class claimants, Your Honor. Your Honor, this is our motion for application of federal rule of bankruptcy procedure 7023 and to certify a class pursuant to federal rule of civil procedure 23.

The class claimants, Mr. Joe Aribe, Michael

Cunningham and Michelle Zieglbaum are unmanifested

claimants. We move pursuant to Section 105 of Title 11

together with Rules 9014 and 7023 afore ordered asking you

to exercise your discretion to apply 7023 to the class

claimants class proof of claim which was filed on behalf of

unmanifested asbestos claims.

Jeanne Mirer is the attorney of Mirer Mazzocchi
Schalet & Julien PCCL or PLLC. She's the class
representative. She has been admitted in this case pro hoc
vice, Your Honor. Her affidavit was attached to the amended
motion and, Your Honor, preliminarily I would ask how the
Court wishes to proceed.

We have, of course, attached affidavits to our application. Those affidavits are largely uncontested by the Debtors. The Debtors in their response attached a number of web searches.

But aside from that, in an affidavit from the noticing agent, there isn't largely a large amount of evidence in this matter. And so I don't know if the Court wants to proceed to argue the merits of the motion or if you

Page 35 1 would prefer to have schedule some sort of evidentiary 2 hearing and that preliminarily I wanted to ask the Court how 3 it wanted to proceed. THE COURT: Well, what's the Debtor's position on 4 5 that? 6 MR. ROGERS: Your Honor, the affidavits are 7 obviously hearsay. It is true that for purposes of this 8 hearing there's nothing in the affidavits that we believe 9 has any impact on the Court's determination of the motion. 10 Nevertheless, we don't agree that the affidavits are 11 admissible evidence and we don't think they should come into 12 evidence. 13 I don't think that there is an evidentiary issue to be decided in the case, so I don't think it makes any 14 15 sense to have an evidentiary hearing. But, you know, we do 16 not agree that the affidavits should come into evidence at 17 this time. 18 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Shore? MR. SHORE: Your Honor, Chris Shore from White & 19 20 Case on behalf of the investor consortium. 21 THE COURT: You're fine. 22 MR. SHORE: We filed a joinder. We have no objection to the declarations going into evidence provided 23 that -- and we could waive cross examination -- provided 24 25 that counsel stipulates on the record that each of the

Page 36 1 affiants receive actual notice of the bar date order and 2 each of the affiants has filed a proof of claim in the 3 action. 4 THE COURT: Mr. Hogan? MR. HOGAN: Your Honor, I know from firsthand 5 6 accounts that they in fact did not receive actual notice of 7 the bar date. They became aware of the bar date but they 8 didn't become aware of the bar date by virtue of the notice 9 provided by the Debtor through their notice process pursuant 10 to the bar date order. And so I can't attest to that issue. 11 THE COURT: All right. Give me a second. 12 MR. HOGAN: Certainly. 13 THE COURT: I assume your affiants aren't present 14 in court. 15 MR. HOGAN: That's correct, Your Honor. It wasn't 16 exactly clear, Your Honor, whether this was going to be an 17 argument on the motion or whether it would be for the 18 purposes of scheduling an evidentiary hearing since we do have the preponderance of the evidence standard that we need 19 20 to meet with regard to our application and I presume that 21 there would be some objection to the entry of those 22 affidavits as evidence. 23 THE COURT: I don't think that it's necessary at least at this point to have an evidentiary hearing and I 24 25 don't think it's necessary to admit the affidavits.

like to hear discussion of the law and based on the record that exists and depending on how that goes I'll determine whether to rule on the merits or whether to put this over for an evidentiary hearing.

MR. HOGAN: That's fine, Your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: You're welcome.

MR. HOGAN: Your Honor, as you're well aware, on
July 15th the Court set a bar date of Monday, December 14th,
2015 for claimants having unmanifested claims to file a
proof of claim.

Generally, Your Honor, you followed the case law in In Re: Grossman from the Third Circuit and directed that such persons who were employees and contractors who encountered asbestos in the asbestos Debtors' facilities or who were exposed by take-home exposure at a household to file what was characterized as an unmanifested asbestos claim. In order to have it discharged in this case. You relied, of course, on the Jeld-Wen Van Brunt matter.

Accordingly, you set two proof of claim, discrete proof of claims, one for manifested and one for unmanifested. You characterized the notice scheme such that everyone presumably would be noticed. The class claimants are persons who are, in fact, they hold unmanifested claims and who as I've said earlier did not receive notice of the bar date.

This motion they filed on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated individuals and in order to preserve the rights as well as the right of their fellow workers and loved ones who feared that they may be unwittingly have their rights disposed of by the bar date.

I attached, as I indicated earlier, the affidavits of Mr. Joe Aribe, an insulator with the Heat and Frost
Insulator and Allied Workers of Local 222 in Deer Park,
Texas who for over 20 years was employed by Vasco. His
affidavit is replete with indications that he was exposed to asbestos, asbestos containing dust from work as a tradesman at the plant.

He was also exposed, Your Honor, during the yearly shutdowns which contained apparently significant exposures when carpenters and painters would sand down asbestos containing joint compound and the asbestos would apparently rain down on him. They were provided, interestingly, no uniforms, Your Honor, and therefore, had to take home their clothes. They would take these clothes home and presumably other individuals in the family would then be exposed to the asbestos by the take-home exposure.

Importantly, Your Honor, he's also in a position as the director of field educational research at the AFL CIO and would -- you would have expected that he would have heard of the bar date. He did not.

So despite his extensive exposure, he is not yet manifested, so he is perfectly characterized as an unmanifested claimant.

Mr. Cunningham also was not suffering from any exposure to asbestos. However, he was an insulator as well in the same union as Mr. Aribe working specifically at the WA Parish Power Plant.

Mr. Cunningham, likewise, did not receive any notice from the Debtors were there notice program of the EFH bar date, even though he's active in the union and even though you would expect him to have received notice through those channels.

Mr. Cunningham represents a class of people who have been exposed in an asbestos plant owned by the Debtors and who has not yet manifested and asbestos-related disease.

Michele Ziegelbaum is a family member of a former contractor who performed work at the Beaver Generating Station in Clatskanie, Oregon, listed as one of the power and nuclear plants owned and operated by the asbestos Debtors.

Her husband suffered from mesothelioma as a result of his exposure. However, Ms. Ziegelbaum has not manifested any asbestos injuries to this point. Interestingly, her husband did not receive any notice of the unmanifested bar date by either direct mailing which would have allowed her

to file the proof of claim.

The claimants filed, in fact, did file their proof of claim before the bar date on behalf of the nationwide class of people who had been exposed either through work or through take-home exposure.

In terms of asking the Court to exercise its discretion, we believe that the courts in this district as well as in the circuit have permitted the exercise of discretion to allow the filing of a class proof of claim relying largely on In Re: American Reserve Corp case and also In Re: Zenith Labs, which is at 104 B.R. 659, that's a bankruptcy from the District of Delaware -- or District of New Jersey, excuse me.

The right to file a proof of claim is governed, as you know, Your Honor, by 11 USC 501. 501's of course silent on actually whether or not a class proof of claims may be filed but other courts have looked to 901(4)(c) which allows a court at any stage of a proceeding to direct that one or more of the other rules of Part 7 shall apply.

Consistent with 904(1)(c) [SIC], the application of federal rule of bankruptcy procedure 702(3) the proof of claims is within the discretion of the Court. That's In Re: Tarragon Corp. and also In Re: American Reserve Corp.

The Third Circuit specifically has not considered the question but, as I said, courts in the circuit have

permitted the class proof of claims to be filed at your discretion.

The Court at In Re: American Reserve articulated compelling arguments in support of interpretation of the bankruptcy rules that permits class proof claims as being consistent with the legislative intent of the drafters of the rules. In Re: Zenith Labs holding that the policies underline class action in congress explicit provision for the application of federal rule of -- or federal rule of civil procedure 23. The bankruptcy proceeding supports the view in the latter cases In Re: American Reserve set forth as the better rule.

The discretionary factors within the scope of the Court's review weigh strongly in favor of permitting claims (indiscernible) to proceed with the class proof of claim.

In Re: Tarragon Corp. in that case the court ordered delineated factors the court should consider when determining whether to exercise its discretion to allow class proof of claim.

Those factors included prejudice to the Debtor and to other creditors, prejudice to the punitive class members, efficient estate administration, the conduct to the bankruptcy case -- conduct in the bankruptcy case of the punitive class representatives in the status of the proceedings of other courts.

Class claims motion here, Your Honor, is presumptively timely. The motion was filed before the bar date. The class proof of claims were both filed before the bar date.

In deciding whether a claim is prejudicial to the Debtor and to the efficiency of the administration of this estate, courts look for the timeliness of the motion and the filing of the underlying proof of claim. As I stated, we filed before the deadline.

District courts have held that 702(3) is properly considered when a class proof of claim or a motion for class certification is filed contemporaneous with a submission of the class proof of claim. It is right and appropriately considered at the time of the filing of the motion for class certification when timely filed with a proof of claim.

There's been no delay here, Your Honor. As argued, the class claimants have conducted themselves diligently and consistent with the efficient administration of this estate. This is their first appearance in the case, Your Honor. It's not as if they've waited.

The lack of delay as to the Debtor applies with equal force to the other creditors. They're not injured in any way by this motion.

Second, failure to exercise the discretion to permit a class proof of claim would result in severe

prejudice to persons similarly situated to the class claimants. The strongest single factor warning the exercise of discretion to permit a class proof of claim is far and away prejudiced to the punitive class members.

Well, our -- well, claimants Aribe and Cunningham as contractors were presumptively entitled to perceive direct mail pursuant to the notice procedures previously addressed by this Court. They received no such notice.

Similarly, claimant Ziegelbaum is married to a person who suffered from meso and her status as a family member of such should have made her readily identifiable for the purpose of mailing requirements in the notice scheme. Class claimants can hardly be said to be unknown unknowns as their names resultively appear in the business records.

In the absence of class certification, such persons with unmanifested injuries dealing claims under Grossman would be subject to discharge. Prejudice then to those persons would be great. They would effectively be brought to due process which the Court has explicitly found in its July 15th, 2015 order that they were due.

Critically, the availability of relief pursuant to Grossman should not weigh against the Court exercising its discretion with respect to Rule 23 in granting this motion.

As this Court has held, the bar date was required as to all claims by the plain language of the statute and on such

basis the that the Court determine a priority the scope of due process protections which each type of unmanifested claimant is entitled.

Should this motion not be granted, such similarly situated class claimants would not file individual proof of claims and may nonetheless be entitled to a pro hoc, post pro hoc, post hoc case-by-case evaluation of other due process rights per Grossman.

Rather, by extending Rule 23 to the proof of claims process, this Court may satisfy the requirements in order in terms of protecting the bar date.

Finally, Your Honor, the case-by-case analysis under Grossman also obviates the concern of an opt-out class will provide an end around to the bar date. Any end around made by the punitive class members opting out pales in comparison to the end run made by a flood of potential claimants seeking an individualized review of their due process rights per Grossman. Thus, the efficient administration of the estate is enhanced by the Court's exercise by applying Rule 7023.

In applying 7023, Your Honor, the Court should grant the motion to proceed the class, the requisite showing under 7023 having been made to secure the class. Generally, Your Honor, what we're looking for is a general class with two sub classes, one class for those individuals who were

Case 23-50939-CSS Doc 2497 Filed 12/18/23 Page 46 of 135 Page 45 1 exposed at work and yet are unmanifested and then a second 2 class for those who were exposed by take-home and who are, 3 again, yet unmanifested. Rule 23 standard requires, obviously, a couple 4 5 things, Your Honor, a number of things. With regard to 6 23(a), we obviously have to demonstrate numerosity, 7 commonality, typicality and adequacy of representation. 8 These are threshold issues that we have to demonstrate, 9 hence my comments earlier about the preponderance of the 10 evidence standard and whether we needed and evidentiary 11 hearing. 12 Once we prove 23(a), we then move to 23(b) and 13 we'll do that, Your Honor, but first let me address the 14 23(a) requirements. First, Your Honor, (indiscernible), 15 (indiscernible) requires a finding of the class 16 representative be appointed only if the joinder of all class 17 members would be impractical. 18 We've seen from the response of the Debtors there's a number of claims that have been filed in excess in 19 20 the thousand, Your Honor. It'd be impractical for the Court 21 to join all those individuals in a single action. 22 Given the scope of the facilities operated by the

Given the scope of the facilities operated by the asbestos Debtors, likewise, lends itself to the fact that joinder would be inappropriate. Class claimants bring this motion on behalf of thousands of similarly situated persons

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whose occupational -- who are occupationally exposed to asbestos in the asbestos Debtor's facilities who have not yet manifested claims.

As the district court in the Third Circuit has found, the numerosity requirement may be met by less than 1000 class members and that's in Beck v. Maximus Inc., 457 F. 3d at 294, finding a proposed class of 776 claimants satisfied the numerosity requirement.

With regard to the next element under 23(a), Your Honor, commonality, a punitive class satisfied 23(a)'s commonality requirement if the main plaintiff shared at least one question of fact or law with grievances of the proposed class.

Here, Your Honor, the bar is not high. Courts have acknowledged a commonality be present even when all members of the plaintiff class have not suffered an injury. That's Baby Neal v. Casey 43 F. 3d 48, where class members don't have identical claims In Re: Credential Insurance 148 F. 3d at 311 and most dramatically where some member claims were arguably not even viable, Sullivan v. DB Investments, Inc., 667 F. 3d at 273.

The focus on commonality, Your Honor, the part in query is not on the strength of each class member's claim but instead on whether the defendant's conduct was common to all the class members, the focus being on the defendant's

Page 47 1 Here we have class-wide answers. The defendant's conduct. 2 conduct was common to all the class members and common questions lead to common answers such as these alleged 3 misconduct and harm it caused whether it would be common to 4 all the class members. 5 6 Here the common questions relate to the health 7 hazards of asbestos, the Debtor knew about those hazards, 8 their failure to warn and the ineffectiveness of the safety 9 products that they utilized for their employees. All class 10 claimants share the above class-wide answers to these 11 questions with the similarly situated class of the persons 12 who they seek to represent. 13 Finally, Your Honor, a single common question 14 regarding Debtor's behavior is sufficient to meet the 15 commonality requirement, thus a class may be certified even 16 in the presence of individualized determinations which may 17 be necessary to completely resolve the claims of each That's In Re: Community 18 punitive class member in the case. 19 Bank of North Virginia versus Mortgage Lending Practices 20 litigation PNC Bank NA 795 F. 3d at 399. 21 Next, Your Honor --22 THE COURT: Mr. Hogan, I do apologize. I have Mr. 23 Seitz on the phone, so I'm going to take a recess and talk 24 to him.

Certainly, Your Honor.

MR. HOGAN:

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1	(Recess)
2	CLERK: All rise.
3	THE COURT: Please be seated. Just very quickly
4	before we continue with Mr. Hogan, and I do apologize. I
5	spoke with Mr. Seitz and he is in court in Philadelphia, but
6	he is available to participate by telephone, so we will
7	obviously deal with Mr. Hogan's matter at depending on
8	when we're done there. We'll take a recess and we'll
9	reconvene the Stewart issue at 1:00 PM, and Mr. Seitz will
10	participate by court call to the extent there are any
11	issues.
12	MR. HUSNICK: Your Honor, my understanding is that
13	Mr. Kotarba has a deposition in New York scheduled for 2:00
14	o'clock. You've I'm sorry?
15	MAN: I already moved it from 1:00 to 2:00. I
16	can't
17	MR. HUSNICK: It's in the
18	THE COURT: But he's a witness. I had a hearing
19	booked all day today.
20	MR. HUSNICK: Understood. Can we try and move it
21	again?
22	MAN: I'll ask. I apologize, it's my deposition.
23	Is there a possibility that we could do it earlier than
24	1:00?
25	THE COURT: No. He's in court.

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1	MR. HUSNICK: While we're doing the asbestos
2	argument, we'll step out into the hall and I'll call his
3	counsel.
4	THE COURT: Yeah, see what you can do. I mean,
5	Mr. Stewart traveled from Texas.
6	MR. HUSNICK: Understood.
7	THE COURT: This was the time for the hearing. I
8	know it's inconvenient and I know everybody expected it
9	would actually be done this morning, but circumstances have
10	evolved in such a manner that we're, you know, in a tough
11	spot.
12	There may be factual questions, if nothing else, I
13	need to ask Mr. Seitz about what was done, what was said, et
14	cetera. He I based on our preliminary conversation, I
15	don't think I'll ask him to abdicate on behalf of Mr.
16	Stewart, but it'll be helpful to have him on the phone.
17	MR. HUSNICK: Understood, Your Honor. I'll step
18	out and try and resolve this action.
19	THE COURT: Okay, thank you.
20	MR. HUSNICK: Thank you.
21	THE COURT: Let me know. Okay, Mr. Hogan. Again,
22	I apologize.
23	MR. HOGAN: Thank you.
24	THE COURT: Again, I apologize.
25	MR. HOGAN: No, Your Honor, not a problem. Just

don't hold me in contempt, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I won't, you're here.

MR. HOGAN: Your Honor, returning to my argument,

I believe I left off with regard to 23(a) with regard to the
typicality requirement, that being the typicality
requirements of 23(a) where a class rep can satisfy those
requirements where they possess the same interest and same - and suffer the same injuries as the other class members.

To avoid a typicality for the purposes of class certification, courts often ask are the class claimants claims typical in the common sense of the class, suggesting that the incentives of the plaintiffs are aligned with those of the class.

Factual differences will not render a claim atypical if the claim arise from the same event or practices or course of conduct that give rise to the claim of the class members. Here -- and further, Your Honor, even where there's the presence of unique defense, that alone will not render a class claim as atypical.

Here, Aribe and Cunningham are members of the class occupationally exposed in plants designed my asbestos debtors, and Ziegelbaum is a family member who was occupationally exposed or a family of someone who was occupationally exposure, and thus, the risk of asbestos-related disease by take-home exposure. As such, all class

claimants may then fill out proof of claim forms and are members of the punitive class.

Further, the claims raised by the class claimants that the asbestos debtors negligently, and with knowledge of the health hazards posed by asbestos, exposed them to asbestos and its attendant harm is a typical legal theory common in every state in which it could be pled.

Further, class claimants stand in the same relation to a legal injury as every other similarly-situation person within the class; that is, each holding a claim as accrued under Grossman, though they have not yet manifested a physical injury. In Re: School Asbestos Litigation, 789 F. 2d at 1000. The typicality requirement was satisfied because the plaintiffs theories of liability were harmonious and the named plaintiff stood in the position similar to the other class members.

Next, Your Honor, the final issue under 23(a) relates to whether the class representative and their attorneys can fairly and adequately represent the interests of their clients. Rule 23 requires that the class rep and class counsel fairly and adequately protect the interest of the class and not the class rep. By the way, Your Honor, just FYI, obviously Jeanne Meyer is the class action attorney in this. To the extent that you were to grant this motion, she's the one who would prosecute the class proof of

claim, Your Honor.

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The adequacy of representation examines two matters, the interest and incentives of the class representatives and the experience and performance of the class counsel. By that inquiry, Rule 23(a) adequacy requirement is designed to uncover conflicts of interest between the name parties and the class they seek to represent. As to class counsel, the adequacy requirement assures that the counsel possess adequate experience and will vigorously prosecute the claim, and will act at an arm's length from the defendant. As attested to in the Meyer affirmation, which is attached to our motion, class counsel is an experienced attorney well versed in bringing class actions in Federal Court and is, therefore, able to provide vigorous prosecution to such claims against the Debtor. There is no conflict here as between the classes because as to both sub-classes, they are individuals who, depending on whether they were exposed at work or by takehome, they still are unmanifested asbestos claimants and they're agnostic to one another, Your Honor.

So, Your Honor, what we have here is an alignment of interest and incentives between the class representatives and the rest of the class. So long as the class members are united in asserting a common right, such as achieving the maximum possible recovery for the class, the class interests

are not agnostic for representation purposes. Thus, there is no fundamental inner class conflict that prevents class certification.

The class claimants in the claim they seek to represent all proceed on the same theories and suffer the same legal harm claims cognizable under Grossman and, yet, unmanifested. Class claimants seek to protect all those with unmanifested claims like them who, for reasons of notice or disability or for other reasons, would not file their claim by the bar date of December 14, 2015.

Class claimants are in no actual conflict with the punitive class members, nor can they have any speculative conflict be adopted by the Debtors to defeat the adequacy requirement.

That brings us to 23(b), Your Honor. Assuming that we can satisfy the requirements of 23(a), we still have to meet one of the requirements of 23(b). In this instance, we focus on 23(b)(3), Your Honor, which states that the claimants have to satisfy or establish predominance and superiority sufficient to satisfy 23(b)(3).

First, Your Honor, the class members are ascertainable. An essential prerequisite of a class action, at least with respect to actions under 23(b)(3), is that the class must be currently and readily ascertainable based on objective criteria. Marcus vs. BMW of North America LLC,

687 F. 3d 583. Thus, the movant must show, again, by the preponderance of the evidence, that the class is ascertainable.

Specifically, ascertainability inquiry is a twofold inquiry requiring first, that the class be defined
reference to an objective criteria, and two, that there is a
reliable and administratively-feasible mechanism for
determining whether punitive class members fall within the
class definition.

The class claimants bring this action to protect the rights of similarly-situated persons who may not have knowledge of the bar date, but who were entitled to file individual class unmanifested proof of claims. Here, the class is defined by the objective of criteria set forth in the proof of claim form, and that the class claimants and the persons similarly situation are present or former employees and contractors who worked for the asbestos debtors in one of the enumerated numbers of facilities and/or family members thereof.

In protecting the due process rights of persons within the scope of the class form -- or the claim form -- this Court, in its July 15, 2015 Order, devised a method of direct notice and notice via targeted media outlets.

Implicit in both methods of notice is that the punitive class claimants are readily identifiable and may be

readily identified by such methods. Specifically, the Court ordered the debtors to make reasonable search of their business records for the names and address of employees and contractors of the asbestos debtors.

Recently, the Third Circuit found that a class -found a class ascertainable where the debtor possessed all
of the relevant records needed to identify the punitive
class members. That's In Re: Community Bank of North
Virginia, 795 F. 3d at 397.

Further, while such method may entail some individual review, such method is not -- such review is not fatal to a finding of ascertainability. Notice of the class could be improved by requiring a further individualized search of the records in mailing such to the specific skilled trade unions in the states where EFH plants existed among other things.

This method would ensure sufficient notice to protect these claimants' due process rights without changing the verdict. Second, Your Honor, we must show that the class claimants' common questions predominate over questions that are individual to them.

Plaintiffs must further establish this for the purpose of satisfying 23(b)(3). Before certifying a 23(b)(3) class, the District Court must evaluate, or a Court must evaluate, whether (indiscernible) questions or fact

that the class members predominate over questions affecting only individual members.

The focus, Your Honor, is on task to see whether the proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive as to warrant adjudication by representation. The focus on predominance inquiry is whether defendant's conduct was common to all the class members, and whether the class members were harmed by the defendant's conduct. That's Sullivan vs. DB Investment, Inc., 667 F. 3d 273.

The predominance inquiry, Your Honor, begins, of course, with the elements of the underlying cause of actions. Predominance requirements focus on the essential elements of the class claims to be proven at trial with common, as opposed to individualized, evidence. Commonality and predominance together are the focus because where an action is to proceed under 23(b)(3), the commonality requirement is subsumed by the predominance requirement.

Class claimants identify the common issues, as I've stated earlier.

In this case, class claimants seek to represent a class of similarly-situated individuals who've been exposed to asbestos by the asbestos debtors, and to put them at risk of developing asbestos-related diseases, but who have not yet become sick and, thus, have the unmanifested claims.

These are questions of defendant's conduct which

predominate.

The ability to satisfy the predominance standard is unimpeded by the existence of different state law standards with regard to the various states -- the various laws of the individual states. The In Re: Sullivan case that I mentioned earlier is specific to that, Your Honor. So the predominance or the primacy of the injuries by these individuals satisfies or overcomes the requirement necessitating the predominance.

As they say in Sullivan, Your Honor, this determination is not a mechanical, single-issue test, but is a determination by looking at the claims, and it is usually sufficient to establish predominance. They really look to the defendant's conduct, Your Honor.

Finally, with regard to the superiority requirement, the class proof of claim is superior method of proceeding in this instance, Your Honor. 23(b)(3) requires that a class claim be superior to other available methods for the fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy, and provides a non-exhaustive list of factors to be considered in determining superiority, including the class members interest and individually controlling the prosecution of the separate actions, the extent and nature of similarly-litigated issues already commenced by class members, which are none in this instance, the desirability

of concentrating the litigation in a particular forum, and the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action.

The superiority requirement asks a Court to balance the terms of fairness and efficiency the merits of a class action versus those of the alternatives available forms of adjudication. Here, it's our position, Your Honor, that a class action is vastly superior to claimants proceeding individually.

A class claim would ensure the broadest due process of those claims that may be disposed by the bar date.

It also comports with the Court's Order by remedying the infirmed implementation of the notice scheme, as demonstrated by these class claimant affidavits.

Not only are class proof of claims superior to individual proof of claims with respect to the due process and the Court's Order as established above, but the common questions in fact and law are best addressed as a class, thus expediting these proceedings and resulting in a significant judicial efficiencies.

With respect to the class members' interest and individually controlling the prosecution of their separate actions, here, as the claims are brought by persons with unmanifested injuries, no person has a significant interest

in controlling in the individual control of a separate action at this stage. Rather, a class mechanism removes what would be burdensome to individual claimants, exerting the effort to protect their rights, even while injuries have not yet manifested.

As to similar litigation, while the number of individual claims filed by the asbestos debtor is not known, class claimants know of no other class proof of claims being brought, nor of any other prior class actions being brought against the asbestos debtors.

With respect to the desirability of concentrating the litigation in this particular forum, just as this Court found it desirable to consolidate the proceedings in this instant forum, by the same logic, the concentration of class proof of claims is not detrimental to the claimants, and is further desirable as permitting and expediting in streamline process.

Finally, Your Honor, the class proof of claims

present no insurmountable challenge to the management of a

class action. While state law of distinctions may implicate

manageability concerns, they do not pose an obstacle to the

certification of a settlement class.

Furthermore, persons who are part of this class who develop asbestos-related diseases -- that is, they manifest -- would simply be moved from the persons with

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unmanifested claims to those with manifested claims. And
like anyone else who filed an individual proof of claim for

unmanifested claim prior to the bar date, would be able to

pursue their manifested claim against the bankruptcy estate.

You'll recall, Your Honor, the plan, of course, provides

6 that asbestos claims are reinstated in pass-through.

Furthermore, 23(d) vests in the Court's substantial discretion to enter orders subsequent to the orders certifying the class to manage the class. This goes a long way to managing any issues that may arise.

In closing, Your Honor, it's our position that the class claim is permissible, that we've satisfied all the requirements necessitated by 23(a), as well as 23(b)(3), and we would offer the affidavits of Mr. Aribe, Mr. Cunningham, and Miss Ziegelbaum into the record, together with the affidavit of Jeanne Meyer. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Hogan. Counselor?

MR. ROGERS: Your Honor, Brent Rogers from

Kirkland & Ellis LLP on behalf of the Debtors. I think Mr.

Hogan's argument is the same argument that he presented in

his briefs. We've responded to those arguments in our

briefs, and I would try not to repeat myself here.

What I didn't hear from Mr. Hogan was any reply to our response. I want to be mindful of the Court's desire to hear about the law and less about the facts. I don't think

we need to hear about the affidavits that were filed along with this motion. I think there's ample evidence in the record for the Court to apply the law that exists and deny this motion.

There's a threshold issue, Your Honor, and that's should the Court apply its discretion to apply Rule 23 to a class proof of claim here. And I want to emphasize the unprecedented nature of that ask in this case. This is not a case where a class has been certified in another action in state court or in federal court, and now the class is coming to this Court and asking to file a proof of claim on behalf of that class. That's the -- as In Re: Sacred Heart pointed out, that's the, you know, quintessential case that's appropriate for a class proof of claim. This is not that case.

This is also not a case where the class that the claimants seek to certify will go on to prosecute a cause of action. The class itself has no cause of action. Because, you know, there's a lot of fuzziness around the definition of the class in this case, but the one thing that is clear is that it is made up of unmanifested claimants. They have no injury yet.

And as Mr. Hogan just pointed out and as they pointed out in Paragraph 77 of their brief, the moment someone in this class manifests an injury, they leave the

class and they become a manifested claimant, they go on to prosecute their own claim. So what that means is that this class, if certified, would really have one purpose only, and that is to file a class proof of claim.

In none of the cases cited on either side has a Court endorsed the application of Rule 23 to a class solely for the purpose of filing a class proof of claim. And, frankly, there's good reason for that, Your Honor. It really makes no sense.

It doesn't serve the purpose of Rule 23. It undermines the purpose of the bankruptcy rules and the bar date order and the notice procedures orders that Your Honor entered. So in this case, I think it's very clear that the discretionary call that Your Honor has to make cuts in favor of denying this motion and refusing to apply Rule 23 to a class proof of claim.

And just to back up, Your Honor, Rule 7023 applies to adversary proceedings. This is not one. To get to the application of Rule 23 to a class proof of claim, you have to go through Rule 9014, which is entirely discretionary. In the Court's that have undertaken that analysis have been very clear that applying Rule 23 to a contested matter, and specifically applying it to a class proof of claim, there's a heightened standard, and it's less likely to be a good idea to apply Rule 23 in these circumstances than in others

in adversary proceedings, for instance.

Mr. Hogan never really grapples with the issue of the Court's discretion and whether it should apply Rule 23 in this case. He does talk about, you know, the prior, I would say, consensus in the law that it's not even appropriate to apply Rule 23, or it's not even possible to apply Rule 23 to a proof of claim because Rule 501 only allows individuals to file proofs of claim. I'm not going to make that argument here. I think it has some merit, but I don't think that it's dispositive. I think there's plenty of other reasons to deny in this case.

I do think that that prior body of law is indicative of the skepticism that courts have applied when they look at a class proof of claim. And I think that, although that body of law has largely been moved away from since the American Reserve case, I think that that skepticism endures.

So the question is, is this the kind of case, is this the right case, is this the right circumstance in the case to go through the long journey from 9014 to 7023 to apply Rule 23 in the first instance. And the answer there, I think, is clearly no. That's setting aside whether the class claimants in this case can even meet the requirements of Rule 23, which I'll get to later, but I want to focus on this discretionary call.

One thing that Mr. Hogan, again, did not respond to at all is what is the impact that this class proof of claim would have on this Court's prior orders. And I think it's very clear that the impact is that it dramatically undermines and, in fact, it renders moot Your Honor's Orders in January on the application of the bar date to unmanifested asbestos claims, and in July, when you entered the noticing order and applied the -- or set the bar date.

In the W.R. Grace case at 389 B.R. 737, that's out of the Bankruptcy District of Delaware in 2008, the Court observed that when you're looking at an issue like this, whether to certify a class on a class proof of claim, you can't do it in a vacuum. You have to consider the impact of the bar date. And you've got to consider, in this case, the impact of the bar date that Your Honor set for unmanifested asbestos claims.

Put simply, if this class is certified and the class proofs of claim are allowed, we can say good-bye to the bar date for unmanifested asbestos claims. That's because any litigant or any potential claimant would then later be able to come in, whether or not they filed their own individual proof of claim by the bar date, they'd be able to come in and leverage the class proof of claim to say I'm a claimant, my rights were reserved by the class proof of claim, notwithstanding the fact that I did not file a

1 proof of claim of my own.

And, you know, I don't think I need to remind the Court, but the bar date Order that Your Honor entered in January was the culmination of a long -- months' long -- process of multiple rounds of briefing, multiple hearings.

And I think the Court's Order was quite clear that not only is it within the Court's discretion to apply the bar date to unmanifested claims, but it's required. It's required by the rules, and the Grossman construct that the Court apply the bar date to unmanifested claimants. This class proof of claim that the class claimants purpose to be seeking would completely that context or that construct.

The other thing that this class proof of claim would do is wipe out, you know, not just the long effort and judicial party resources that went into getting the bar date to apply to unmanifested asbestos claims, but after that happened, as Your Honor knows, the Debtors and the EFH Committee worked long and hard to construct a notice program to, as best as possible, get notice out to all potential unmanifested asbestos claimants.

That order was heavily negotiated. It was consensual. And it led to the issuance of, I think, somewhere around 70,000 direct notices, not to mention all the indirect notice or the constructive notice through publications and newspapers on websites, et cetera. All

1 those forms of notice were designed to get the word out.

And what Mr. Hogan says about these class claimants not having notice doesn't make sense to me. They filed their proof of claims. They're in Court today arguing about the bar date. They clearly know about the bar date.

Now, did they get that notice directly from the Debtors? I, frankly, don't know. There's no evidence on that, and we don't really need evidence. What we do know is that they have notice. And what that shows, I think, Your Honor, is that the notice program that's been constructed has been effective.

It's not a program that is only effective if
everyone gets notice from the Debtors. It is a program
that's designed to get the word out through whatever
channels are available, whether it's through someone's
counsel at the union or through someone's spouse or through
a friend. All of those are signs, signals of effective
notice, and I think that's what's been done here.

So this proof of claim, or this class proof of claim request, is -- you know, one of the things it's going to do if granted is it's going to require the Debtors to undertake that whole notice program again. Rule 23 requires notice to potential class members of their potential status as a class member. And I think Mr. Hogan has said, and they said in their brief, that the notice that they would propose

that we give to potential class members start at least with
the -- at the base line of the same notice that we gave the
first time around. S

o we're now talking about duplicating what I believe is somewhere around \$2.5 million worth of effort to get the word out. That, to me, seems like a tremendous waste of resources of the debtors.

Your Honor, this Court has already shot down two attempts at least to mount a collateral attack inappropriately on the January Order -- or the January Memorandum Opinion and the Order on the bar date and the notice.

The first of those was when asbestos plaintiffs' firms came in and asked for the appointment of a class representative for unmanifested claims and future claims. Then Your Honor said the time to -- the time to appeal the bar date Order has passed. The time to appeal the notice of procedures has passed. I'm not going to hear that today.

You did the same thing in connection with the confirmation hearing when asbestos plaintiffs came in and said that the Order -- that the reorganization could not be confirmed because of due process concerns to unmanifested claimants.

Again, you emphasized the protective nature of the notice program that was entered, the fact that there was no

appeal of that, and denied that relief as an inappropriate collateral attack. And so, Your Honor, the Debtors submit that you should deny, as well, this as an inappropriate collateral attack on those two rulings by the Court.

Now let's look at the other side of the ledger.

We've talked about the -- you know, the bad aspects of this request for proof of claim on behalf of the class. What do we get as a benefit?

Well, Mr. Hogan has focused both in his briefing and his argument today on prejudice to class members. Let's start with the class members who are similarly situated to the three who purport to be representatives of the class. There's no prejudice to them if this order is denied. They have filed proofs of claim in advance of the bar date.

What I think Mr. Hogan's really getting at is the other class members who are different from the ones who appear in court today, the class members who may not have received notice through any channel. The Court has already addressed the issue of due process and prejudice to unmanifested claimants multiple times in the context of the orders that I just discussed.

In lieu of that, the notice program that we have and that we implemented was reasonably calculated to reach as many of the potential claimants as possible. So that's sort of a due process protection on the front end.

Then as Mr. Hogan acknowledges, there's a due process protection on the back end as well. And that is if a claimant, notwithstanding our efforts to get the word out, comes into court and says, "I didn't hear this. I didn't know about it. I now have an asbestos claim because I have an injury. I should be relieved from the bar date," then the Court has the ability under the rules to -- you know, for cause shown, to grant relief from that bar date. So there's a due process protection on the back end.

And Mr. Hogan sort of acknowledges that, but then tries to shift the discussion from prejudice and due process to this concern about efficiency, which is yeah, we have this protection on the back end, but if you don't grant this motion and allow the class proof of claim, what that means is that you're going to get what they call an avalanche of post bar date proofs of claim and injuries coming into court and that there's going to have to be a case-by-case determination on those claims.

Well, that is the construct that Grossman sets up and that we think the Court should apply, but I think this concern about efficiency and the avalanche of claims is really misstated and has no support.

We have received, I believe, 10,000 unmanifested claims so far as of today. There's no indication in the record or in the experience of the Debtors that after the

bar date there's going to be a sudden flood of manifested claims that are going to come into court and allege that their due process rights were violated because the notice never reached them.

What's really going on here, I think, Your Honor, is that Mr. Hogan is trying to flip the burden of showing a due process violation and to take that burden off of the plaintiffs where it would sit with -- under the Grossman standard, and put that on the defendants. In fact -- I'm sorry, the Debtors, and in fact, it would be a preclusive burden because we would not have an opportunity to show that their due process rights weren't violated. They'd be able to come in regardless of whether they receive notice or not and file a claim after the bar date because they would say they were protected by the class proof of claim.

So this efficiency concern doesn't hold water.

Not only that, but when you think about the tremendous duplication of efforts that would obtain if we had to go through the notice process again. That's the opposite of efficiency. That is a massive inefficiency in the process.

So the two aspects or the two arguments that the class claimants make in favor of applying Rule 23 just don't hold up. And the traditional, more traditional reasons to apply Rule 23 in the bankruptcy context also don't hold up. So as the Court observed in American Reserve, you know,

efficiency in terms of consolidation of claims in a single forum isn't really an argument in favor of a class treatment in bankruptcy because the claims are already consolidated in a single forum.

So what the courts really look to is, is it serving the function of Rule 23 in that it's bringing claims that otherwise would not be filed into court and getting them filed? And I think from experience we know that that's not the case here.

The burden of filing claims in this Court, the proofs of claim, is minimal, and we've already seen, as I said -- I believe the numbers are 10,000 and 12,000 claimants file unmanifested proofs of claim. So there appears to be no impediments to unmanifested claimants getting into court. And with the notice program being as robust as it is, there's also no impediment to getting the word out.

For instance in American Reserve, the Court, when it articulated this rule, said that the bankruptcy court in that case could achieve all of the benefits of class treatment in the bankruptcy context simply by making sure that appropriate notice got out to the claimants. That's exactly what's happened here.

So that all goes to the question of whether the Court should apply its discretion and apply Rule 23 in the

first place. And we think it's quite clear that the Court should decline to do so. Nevertheless even if the Court were to apply its discretion to apply Rule 23 through 9014 and 7023, we don't think that the class claimants have come in with -- that the class claimants have put forward a viable Rule 23 class. And I don't think you need to look to the affidavits to make that determination.

I think you can simply look at the class that they're trying to -- the class that they're trying to certify and ask as a matter of first principles whether that satisfies Rule 23. It does not.

One thing I would like to highlight is -- and I spent a little more time with their briefs over the last week -- there's a real lack of clarity as to what is the class they want to certify. Does it include folks who received direct notice? Does it include folks who were in the area of constructive notice in a publication? Does it include people like the claimants? Apparently it includes folks who received notice through channels other than direct notice.

Is it limited to people who did not receive direct notice or were not targets of constructive notice? Is it limited to people who have not filed a proof of claim? Or does it include the 10,000 folks who have already taken the initiative to do so? Does it include only people who are in

trade unions as is suggested in one of the affidavits? Or is it a larger class that includes all unmanifested claimants?

If you look at particular paragraphs of their brief, you could interpret them in any of these ways. And I think that shows a lack of clarity around the class that's going to be satisfied, but it also, as you're going through the factors for Rule 23, it's important because it has an impact on the way you analyze those factors.

But let's walk through quickly those factors and how they would play out according to different definitions of the class. So if you look at Rule 23(a), the numerosity standard, well, here it really matters how we're defining the class in a sense because if we're defining the class only as those folks who have received zero notice of the bar date and the bankruptcy, then presumably, that's going to be a very small class given the robust nature of the notice program. And we certainly haven't seen any indication that there's a large group of people who have received no notice whatsoever.

Regardless, even if it includes the entire class of unmanifested claimants, the entire group, I don't the requirement of numerosity is met here because numerosity doesn't just mean let's count the heads. It means how difficult is it to join those parties into an action?

And that concept, the concept of joinder, really has no meaning in this context. There's no joinder of parties that would be necessary absent a class proof of claim here. If there's no class proof of claim, there are individual proofs of claim. That's just the status quo.

And as I mentioned, there's no going forward use for this class, so there's no need to join these people into a class for purposes of prosecuting a claim. So I think the numerosity standard, however you look at the class and however it's defined, is not met here.

Next, commonality. And so here again, it really reflects the mistaken view that this class is somehow a class of people with a cause of action. When I say it reflects, I mean Mr. Hogan's argument and the brief reflect that because all of their arguments about commonality are about issues including the conduct of the s, the risk of asbestos exposure, etc., those are not issues that are before the Court on a proof of claim.

Those are issues that will be before the Court if there is an asbestos litigant who comes to Court and has an injury, but that's not the question that's before the Court today.

So as to what's before the Court today, the filing of the proofs of claim and whether a late filing would be appropriate, there's little commonality among the purported

class members, especially if you're looking at the entire class of unmanifested claimants. Some received a notice; some didn't. Some filed proofs of claim; some didn't and some are in a situation where they are direct exposures, and some are take home exposures. So there's no one question across the class that really is a question that Your Honor has to answer at this stage of the litigation.

Then typicality; do these particular purported class representatives -- are they typical of the entire class? Again, it probably depends on how you define a class.

But if you're defining the class to include all unmanifested claimants, the answer is no, these are not typical because they are folks who got notice in a very particular way, and to the extent that they are purporting to be representing people who got no notice, they are not even a member of that class.

So these -- this group of potential claimants cannot represent adequately the interests of the folks that they say are really the target of this class protection, which is the group that did not receive any notice.

On that predominance question, which is commonality plus, again, because there's no commonality of questions across this class, there can be no for dominance.

Extent of litigation already filed is another factor. Here

Page 76 1 we have 10,000 or more individually filed proofs of claim 2 that cut strongly against having a class because we've seen from experience that folks are filing these claims on their 3 4 own. 5 Concentration in a particular forum is one of the 6 factors under Rule 23. I think I've already addressed that, 7 that we have a concentration in the bankruptcy court 8 already. We don't need a class mechanism to do that. 9 And then finally, superiority. I think for all of 10 the reasons that I've articulated today and in our brief, 11 the idea that a class proof of claim a superior to the 12 Grossman construct that's already in place, it falls flat. It falls short. 13 14 And for that reason, the Debtors respectfully 15 submit that the order should be denied. The Court should 16 decline to apply its discretion and apply Rule 23. And even 17 if the Court does apply Rule 23, it should find that those -- the factors under Rule 23 have not been met. 18 Thank you, 19 Your Honor. 20 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Rogers. Mr. Shore? 21 MR. SHORE: Good morning, Your Honor. Chris Shore 22 from White & Case on behalf of the investor consortium. 23 I'll be brief. 24 Let me give you two updates first on the deal 25 which is proceeding apace. The Court may have seen that

there was some legislation that had been proposed that would bar tax-free spinoffs into REITs. The bill that came out I think last night has a grandfather in for transactions that are subject to a pending PLR. So we kind of dealt with that problem.

There's been PUCT testimony filed. It's all kind of what we expected, and that's moving forward to those January dates still. So from our perspective, the transaction is moving as it should be, and by the end of the first quarter, beginning of the second quarter, we anticipate being the owners of EFH. As such, we're keenly interested in addressing the asbestos problem at EFH.

To that end, while the deal was going forward and, and during the plan negotiations, we worked very hard with Kirkland to understand the problem and to understand the bar date, why that was put in place, and proceed with that rather than card out everybody is part of a planned settlement.

In other words, we let that objection press so that we could keep the deal as structured and would provide a cordoning off of the liability so that we can know what we're investing into.

To that end, obviously a great deal of money was spent noticing and performing pursuant to the two prior court orders -- that's money that came out of the new

equity's pocket from our perspective -- all to satisfy the due process concerns of unmanifested claimants. So we would reiterate that the Court exercise its discretion not to certify a class which essentially wastes all that money that was spent.

I'm only going to add one point, and it's really an emphasis on the legal side of it. You know, there's one key development that isn't really focused on by either side so far since the filing of the papers. The bar date has come and gone.

In the eyes of the law right now, the three declarants have claims against the s. Everybody else has no claims against the Debtors that they can prosecute absent relief from the bar date order.

The -- so this whole case is far as I'm concerned hinges on the Court's application of Rule 3001(b), which is who's an authorized representative? A class proof of claim was purported to have been filed on behalf of all those parties. There was no authority to file that proof of claim at the time oddly enough. It's the second kink of the day where we have an issue with respect to who's authorized to act on whose behalf and when.

So what they're really asking for is retroactive authorization to file a proof of claim on behalf of these parties. Their only mechanism for doing so is Rule 23, and

that's why I think you have to look at the class for the purposes of today's motion as parties who did not receive notice and did not file proofs of claim, because that's the only class for which they can have authority to do anything right now.

And when you look at the proposed class representatives, they have nothing to do with that class because they did receive notice, actual notice, and they did actually file proofs of claim. So I don't think using the Rule 23 mechanism in this case to give them retroactive authorization to file a proof of claim as appropriate here. And for those reasons, we'd ask you to deny the motion.

MR. HOGAN: Thank you, Your Honor. I'll be brief.

Your Honor, Debtors' counsel raised at its essence really

what this controversy relates to, and that is, is the action

Thank you, Mr. Shore. Mr. Hogan?

THE COURT:

what this controversy relates to, and that is, is the action between the class or individuals, who have no cause of action currently because they're unmanifested, versus individuals, those same individuals, who, while not having a cause of action, have a claim pursuant to the construct in Grossman. And so there's a void in that. They don't have a

The cause of action won't arise until they manifest. And as such, there needs to be protection for those individuals until such time as they manifest. The

cause of action, but yet they have a claim.

purpose of the request for the class proof of claim isn't necessarily to prosecute those claims as they manifest, but instead to preserve the status quo until they manifest.

Class actions for the purpose of injunctive relief are not unheard of, Your Honor, and that's effectively what this class purports to do.

As it relates to the argument that we haven't met our burden with regard to 9014, the burden remains a preponderance of the evidence. Other than argument, Your Honor, there, there is no evidence as to whether or not we satisfied our burden. Our class purports to represent unmanifested asbestos claimants either exposed at work or through take-home exposure.

The impact of the Court's prior rulings really has no impact, Your Honor. Our argument isn't inconsistent with what you ruled in the -- with regard to the bar date and your reliance on Grossman. I was involved in the Grossman case unfortunately, Your Honor. I represented the Van Brunts as local counsel. I know all about that case. That case was an -- that case really largely stems on an application of lookback to try and resolve a one-off exposure by a claimant. It wasn't constructed with this application in mind.

Your bar date order contains no admonition or prohibition against filing a class proof of claim. It says

unmanifested claimants have to file a proof of claim. It doesn't say no class proof of claims shall be filed. We don't see it as an inappropriate collateral attack.

Throughout the Debtor's response to my motion they've mischaracterized my involvement, and I just raise it as an issue, Your Honor, just so the Court and the record are clear.

Hogan McDaniel doesn't have an "S" at the end of McDaniel. No big deal. Misspelled repeatedly throughout the response. Not a big deal. Bigger, though, Your Honor, is the fact that I'm not a PI law firm. My firm's not a PI law firm. It's represented throughout their response that where a PI law firm. Do I have co-counsel that are PI law firms? Absolutely. But I just wanted the record to be clear on that, Your Honor.

Your Honor, the prejudice to the unmanifested claimants is real. If the class proof of claim is not allowed, you'll be left with the one-off Grossman analysis with regard to every individual who comes in and says they didn't get notice. The purpose of the class is to short-circuit that inquiry without short-circuiting the bar date. The bar date exists. We understand that. It's passed.

The purpose of this is to coalesce those individuals so that their claims can continue on in light of the bar date, and so that they -- when they manifest, won't

be prejudiced by what has already occurred. Their claim will manifest as the Debtors have said. They don't have cause of action, but they have a claimant.

That just doesn't make sense, Your Honor. I mean,
I know it does within the context of the law, but from the
unmanifested claimant's point of view, 10 years from now,
when all of a sudden somebody shows up with mesothelioma and
they have no idea of the bar date and they try to assert a
claim, and the analysis is going to be not on whether
they're sick or not but on whether or not they got notice of
the bar date. And inherently that just seems unfair, Your
Honor.

Finally, Your Honor, with regard to the burden of the proof of claim being minimum, there is no impediment, Your Honor. We filed the claims. They're after -- they were filed before the bar date. It's a viable claim. It includes all unmanifested claimants, and that's our position, Your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: You're welcome. All right, thank you very much. I am going to deny the motion for a number of reasons. First of all, as a preliminary matter, it's a question of the Court's discretion whether to apply Rule 7023 to a situation where we're talking about the filing of a proof of claim on behalf of the class.

The -- as counsel pointed out and in my experience

as well doing independent research, to allow a class proof of claim under the facts and circumstances of this case would be unprecedented. We don't have an existing class action. We often see this where we have and existing WARN Act class, for example, that's been certified by this Court. And though a proof of claim is filed on behalf of that class, it's a completely different situation here. We don't have this pending asbestos manifested or unmanifested injury claim lawsuit pending somewhere, where a class has been certified.

We're talking about certifying a class solely for purposes of filing a proof of claim. And I think that is where -- to allow that would be in effect a collateral attack on what this Court has already done, which is set a bar date as required by the bankruptcy rules, requiring filing by unmanifested claimants as contemplated by Grossman's, and establishing and approving an elaborate noticing procedure that cost several million dollars designed to provide a notice as adequately as possible to as many possible claimants as possible. None of those matters have been appealed, and they are final orders.

Really Mr. Hogan made at the end an impassioned and interesting and perhaps in some ways weighty argument, which was a collateral attack not on this Court, but on the Third Circuit's opinion on Grossman's, drawing the

distinction between a claim and a cause of action. That is the law, and the fact that you have a claim at the time of exposure, but not a cause of action until injury, is a distinction the Third Circuit has made and that I have to apply in the context of what my job is.

To apply or to allow the filing of a class proof of claim here and fit that into the bar date mechanism that's under the rules really is to try to fit a square peg into a round hole. It just doesn't make any sense. If I were to certify however I were to draw the lines, which are unclear to me, I agree with the Debtors from the motion exactly how that class would be technically certified.

But if I were to allow a class to file this class proof of claim on behalf of unmanifested claimants, the whole point of the bar date goes away because everybody's covered. What's the point of the bar date? And the reality is bar dates are how you operate bankruptcy cases, and they're required by the rules, and they have legal significance, both for reorganizing the estate and for dealing with the claims vs. assets distribution of value.

The fact that the claims here are being reinstated as opposed to being distributed, a subset of consideration under a plan, I don't think makes a difference here. The same principle applies. So I will not exercise my discretion to apply Rule 7023 at all to the filing of a

class proof of claim here.

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In addition, were I to do that, I will assume solely for purposes of this ruling that Rule 23 is met here. And that would be without a prejudice on remand if I am remanded and appealed to actually make a factual finding. But we didn't have an evidentiary hearing, and I'll take the affidavits for these purposes on their face value and find that 23(a) is a satisfied, but I don't think 23(b)(3) is satisfied in this situation because 23(b) says -- (b)(3) says that the Court finds -- this is the order to satisfy, 23(b)(3) -- "The Court finds that the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual matters, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy." I don't believe that in this situation the class action is superior to other available methods.

The superior method here is a method that's already occurred, the establishment of a bar date and the establishment of an elaborate notice procedure, which has worked frankly. It's one way or the other in that we have, at least on the face of the affidavits, three persons who did not receive a mailing from the noticing agent that nonetheless got sufficient notice that they -- prior to the bar date that they were put in a situation where they could

file a proof of claim.

So I find that (b)(3) would not be satisfied in this situation. So for those reasons, I will also talk about due process. I spoke at length at confirmation in overruling the objection to confirmation reiterating my findings as to the issues of due process. And I would incorporate those, rather than going through this whole process again, into today's ruling. And just to be clear again, perspective due process is preserved, or, excuse me, is met. Perspective due process is met by the bar date notice being provided.

The issue of whether that due process as applied is sufficient to individual claimants is fully preserved. And that's what Grossman's is about. So if there are unmanifested claimants, who don't file a proof of claim, who manifest an injury in the future, and who attempt to file some sort of claim and prosecute a cause of action against the reorganized, their ability to argue under Grossman's that the due process I previously approved was insufficient and that their claim should survive, their cause of action should survive, that's fully preserved, and that we'll be decided on a fact-by-fact and a case-by-case basis in the future by whatever judge has to decide those issues.

I think that is sufficient and superior to requiring or allowing the issuance of a class cause of -- or

Page 87 1 class proof of claim in this instance. So I will again deny 2 the motion on the merits. And do you have a form of order? MR. ROGERS: We do, Your Honor. I -- as you want 3 to point out one provision in the order that I didn't 4 mention in my argument, and that is we have in Paragraph 3 5 6 that the class proofs of claim that have already been filed, and we have three proofs of claim that have been filed that 7 8 purport to be on behalf of the class, we would have those 9 expunged from the claims register to the extent that they 10 purport to be filed on behalf of anyone other than the named 11 claimant. 12 THE COURT: All right. 13 MR. ROGERS: So we'd put that in the order. 14 THE COURT: Thank you. 15 MR. ROGERS: May I approach, Your Honor? 16 THE COURT: Yes. Thank you. I'm going to interlineate under Paragraph 1, where it says, "The motion 17 18 is denied as set forth herein," I'm going to add, "and for the reasons set forth on the record at the hearing." 19 20 All right. With that change, I've signed the 21 order. We'll take a -- Mr. Husnick, how are we on our 22 witness? 23 MR. HUSNICK: We're good, Your Honor. 24 THE COURT: Okay. 25 MR. HUSNICK: The witness will be available to

Page 88 1 testify. 2 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. We'll reconvene. We'll take a recess and reconvene at 1:00 and 3 take up the Stewart matter. 4 5 (Recess) 6 CLERK: All rise. 7 THE COURT: Please be seated. All right. We're 8 going to continue with the Stewart matter. And we have Mr. 9 Seitz available on the telephone now. And I don't know if there -- is there any 10 11 additional thing you want to say before we turn it over to Mr. -- well I'm going to ask Mr. Seitz some questions and 12 13 then turn it over to Mr. Stewart. 14 MS. YENAMANDRA: Sure. Your Honor, again, Aparna Yenamandra from K&E on behalf of the Debtors. 15 16 We just wanted to say on our behalf Mr. Kotarba is 17 here. We're happy to do a short direct of him as well. It 18 will mirror what was in his declarations and his proffered testimony, but defer to Your Honor on whether that would be 19 20 helpful, given that the scope of the cross should be limited 21 to what was provided on direct. 22 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Seitz, if you -- if you're available to answer just a couple questions and then what 23 we'll do is we'll offer up the witness for cross 24 25 examination, if anyone wishes to cross examine him.

want to make an additional direct, that's fine.

THE COURT: Though if you could help the Court with just a recitation of the -- you know, what happened, what was done, you know, what the chronology is from your involvement in April to -- I believe it was April 2015 till your -- till today. And I understand there was some discovery that may have occurred, so I'm just trying to clarify, for the record, for my own understanding and for Mr. Stewart's understanding, exactly sort of what happened and what you did in your role as counsel.

MR. SEITZ: Certainly, Your Honor. First of all, when we were retained, the proofs of claim had already been filed and were of record. They're voluminous documents so the first thing we did after our retention was to review all those records and try to address some of the issues that with had, with our client, about the connections between the records and the various parties in the case.

After considerable back and forth with the client on those points, we made the recommendation that discovery be propounded of the Debtors to try to elicit any information or documentation they may have, because the -- in the circumstances of the Debtors, there was a lack of access to various documents that the Debtors may have had in their possession.

So we did, in consultation with the client,

propound those. The Debtors provided responses to that discovery. We -- I consulted with the clients about that discovery and the effect of those responses and made recommendations to the client as a result of a combination of the review of all the discovery in the case and the various claims that had been filed and the amendments to claims that had been filed and the records that the client had provided.

As of December 4th, we made certain recommendations to the client that I really can't go into because of the attorney/client relationship, but the client was not happy with our recommendations and we allowed additional time for the Debtor to provide -- the client to provide additional information to us. That was not satisfactory, so on December 8th we provided a written notice to the client that, you know, we were no longer a -- we had an impasse in our views as to how the case and prosecution of these claims should be handled and we were disengaging as counsel.

And we encouraged the client to get replacement counsel on our behalf. And we reminded the client that there was an evidentiary hearing scheduled, by the Debtors, for December 16th, and that they should have an attorney for that conference -- or for that hearing.

The client provided us with additional information

Page 91 1 that didn't change our mind as to the representation of 2 them. We communicated that to them, again, reminded them that the hearing was going forward and that they should have 3 counsel and that they should have their counsel contact us 4 so that we could do a substitution. When that was not 5 6 forthcoming, we filed a notice of withdrawal of our entry of 7 appearance in the case. 8 THE COURT: All right. There was some amended 9 claims filed or another claim filed, I think in -- later, after the representation occurred. You were not involved in 10 11 that. Is that correct? That's correct. 12 MR. SEITZ: 13 THE COURT: Okay. Let's do this. Why don't you 14 put on your witness for your supplemental direct, and then I'll make him available for cross examination. 15 Mr. Seitz, if you could stay on, I'd appreciate 16 17 it. 18 MR. SEITZ: I will, Your Honor. THE COURT: Please take the stand and remain 19 20 standing. 21 CLERK: Please raise your right hand. Do you 22 affirm you're willing to tell the truth, the whole truth, 23 and nothing but the truth, to the best of your knowledge and 24 ability? 25 MR. KOTARBA: I do.

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1	CLERK: Please state and spell your name for the
2	record.
3	MR. KOTARBA: Sure. Steve Kotarba. K-O-T-A-R-B-
4	A.
5	CLERK: Thank you.
6	THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Kotarba.
7	MR. KOTARBA: Thank you.
8	THE COURT: Sorry about the delay.
9	MR. KOTARBA: Not a problem.
10	MR. GANTER: Your Honor, Jonathan Ganter of
11	Kirkland & Ellis on behalf of the Debtors. We prepared a
12	binder of just materials from the docket. Permission to
13	approach and provide it to you?
14	THE COURT: Yes. Thank you. Did you give Mr.
15	Stewart a copy?
16	MR. GANTER: Mr. Stewart, you have a copy from
17	beforehand?
18	MR. STEWART: Yes. Yes, sir.
19	THE COURT: Okay.
20	DIRECT EXAMINATION
21	BY MR. GANTER:
22	Q Mr. Kotarba, could you please introduce yourself for
23	the Court.
24	A Sure. Steve Kotarba. I'm a managing director with
25	Alvarez & Marsal.

Page 93 1 And what exactly does Alvarez & Marsal do? 2 Sure. We provide financial advisory services, we're serving that role with respect to the Debtors in these 3 4 cases. 5 So, can you elaborate a little bit more on A&M. 6 okay if we refer to Alvarez & Marsal as A&M --7 Α Sure. 8 -- you understand that? You -- or expound a little bit 9 on what A&M's role is with regard to this matter in 10 particular? 11 Sure. With respect to the incident matter, we're 12 serving to lead the process to reconcile the various claims 13 that have been filed in these cases. So for example, as the 14 claims come in, we're leading the process to -- to -- to 15 undertake to look at those claims, review them and take 16 positions as to their validity. 17 And you're a senior member of the claims evaluation 18 team, correct? 19 That's correct. 20 Are you familiar with the proofs of claim filed by Ms. 21 Stewart that are the subject of today's hearing? 22 I am. Α And just to be clear, those proofs of claim are numbers 23 5739, Number 10003 and Number 10982? 24 25 That's correct.

Page 94 1 Mr. Kotarba, your declaration in support of the 14th --2 the Debtors' Fourteenth Omnibus Objection is already --MR. GANTER: -- was moved into evidence this 3 4 morning, I believe, Your Honor? 5 THE COURT: Yes. 6 MR. GANTER: Is that accurate? 7 THE COURT: Yes. 8 MR. GANTER: We didn't apply a number to it, but 9 it will be -- that will be Defendant -- Debtors' Exhibit 1 10 in your binder. 11 THE COURT: Okay. 12 Could you please turn to Tab 1 in your binder, sir. 13 I'm there. Α What was the purpose of A&M and the claims evaluations 14 15 team of reviewing the proofs of claim as described in your 16 Debtors' Exhibit 1? 17 Sure. We undertake a process to review all of the 18 claims that are filed in the case, as I said earlier, to review them for their validity. With respect to the 19 20 Fourteenth Omnibus Objection, as we go through the series of 21 claims, they'll fall into certain categories. One of the 22 categories that's pertinent here are claims where we think 23 there's no basis, based on the company's books and records, or what we call a no-liability claim. So one of the bases 24 25 for the objection, Omnibus 14, was to object to claims for

Page 95 which we thought the estates had no liability. 1 2 And with regard to Omnibus 14, you reviewed -- the 3 claims investigation team reviewed two of Ms. Stewart's claims. Is that right? 4 5 That's correct. 6 I'd ask you to please turn to Tab 5 in your binder. 7 Okay. I'm there. Α Do you recognize what Debtors' Exhibit 5 is? 8 9 Α I do. 10 And what is it? 11 It's Proof of Claim Number 5739. 12 And this -- was this one of the proofs of claim -- Ms. 13 Stewart's proofs of claim that was reviewed related to 14 Omnibus Objection -- the Fourteenth Omnibus Objections? 15 It is. 16 And then if you could turn to the next tab, which is 17 Debtors' Exhibit 6. Let me know when you're there. 18 I'm there. 19 Could -- do you recognize this? 20 I do. 21 And what is this, sir? 22 This is Claim 10003. This is one of Ms. Stewart's proofs of claim that was 23 24 investigated in relation to your Fourteenth Omnibus 25 Objections?

Page 96 1 It is. 2 Okay. At a high level, Mr. Kotarba, could you please describe the inquiry that was performed with regard to 3 Debtors' Exhibits 5 and 6, the Proofs of Claim 5739 and 4 10003? 5 6 Sure. So as the claims come in, we receive, "we" being 7 the A&M claims team, receives those claims. We'll do our 8 own investigation and review of those claims in an attempt 9 to ascertain the validity of those claims, their ties to the 10 company's books and records, the statements and schedules 11 that have been filed in these cases. Where we're unable to 12 take a position as to here or need further support to 13 reconcile that claim, we'll reach out to the company, which we did in these cases. 14 15 So we'll conduct a review, then we'll reach out to 16 the company, give them sort of the results, preliminary 17 thoughts on our review and then elicit their additional 18 support and research to further attempt to reconcile the claim. 19 20 So before we get to the results of that review, 21 Debtors' Exhibits 5 and 6, can you tell us, as parts of that 22 inquiry, did that involve review of the proofs of claim 23 themselves? It did. 24 Α 25 And did it also involve review of the materials

Page 97 1 appended to the proofs of claim, so attached to them? 2 It did. Mr. Kotarba, what did the inquiry regarding Debtors' 3 Exhibits 5 and 6 reveal? 4 5 We were unable to make any sort of connection between 6 the claims asserted and -- either claim, and the Debtors or 7 their estates. Essentially we determined that the estates 8 had no liability for these claims, because we couldn't 9 determine any sort of connection or nexus between the claims 10 and the Debtors. 11 On that point, you said that the claims had no 12 liability. 13 That's correct. 14 Could -- direct you, sir, to Paragraph 5 of Debtors' 15 Exhibit 1, which is, again, your declaration in support of 16 the Debtors' Fourteenth Omnibus Objections. Let me know 17 when you're there. 18 All right. I'm there. Okay. If you see at the beginning of Paragraph 5 your 19 20 declaration states that, "Upon review of the proofs of claim filed against the Debtors in these Chapter 11 cases, the 21 22 Debtors have identified 61 no-liability claims listed on 23 Exhibit 2 to Exhibit A." Do you see that? I do. 24 Α 25 Sir, now if you could turn to Tab 3 in your binder.

Page 98 1 And as you're turning there, I'll represent that this is 2 Exhibit A to the Debtors' Fourteenth Omnibus Objections, which is on the docket at 405-2. Okay? 3 I'm there. 4 Α And then when you're there, if you could turn to -- so 5 6 do you recognize this, sir? 7 Α I do. 8 Could you please turn to Page 27 of 33, using the 9 numbers at the top? 10 I'm there. 11 Or actually, I'm sorry, before we go to 27 of 33, can 12 you please turn to 18 of 33. 13 Okay. I'm there. 14 And explain what this shows. 15 This is just the cover page of Exhibit 2 to 16 Exhibit A. So in -- in the context of how we file our 17 objections, we file an Omnibus objection, which would have 18 the narrative that describes the basis for the objection, generally and then we attach exhibits that would list the 19 20 specific claims that are subject to each type of objection. 21 And is this the same Exhibit 2 to Exhibit A that was --22 we just looked at in Paragraph 5 of your declaration at the 23 Debtors' Exhibit 1? 24 Α That's correct. 25 All right. Now, if you could go to 27 of 33.

Page 99 1 Um hmm. 2 And I'll direct you to Entries 56 and 57. 3 I see those. Explain what these show. 4 Okay. What these do is they simply list out, for the benefit 5 6 of the claimant and others reviewing the objection, the 7 claimant's name, the case number where the claim was 8 originally filed, and then other particulars with respect to 9 the claim and then there's a column, the last column, which 10 states our reason for disallowance. And we give the reason 11 why we're disallowing the claim, which ties back to the 12 narrative in the Omnibus objection. 13 And just to be clear, for the record, Entries 56 and 57 are they Ms. Stewart's claims, which we looked at as 14 Debtors' Exhibits 5 and 6? 15 16 They are. Yes. 17 And so the determination was those were no-liability 18 claims? 19 That's correct. 20 Sir, now you also -- we also -- in evidence already, if 21 you could turn to Debtors' Exhibit 2. And what you'll see 22 here is that this is the -- your declaration, in support of 23 the Debtors' Thirty-Third Omnibus Objections. Do you see that? 24 25 I do.

- 1 O Can you please compare the work -- A&M's work and the
- 2 claims investigations team's work related to the subject
- 3 matter covered in this declaration with that in Debtors'
- 4 Exhibit 1?
- 5 A Sure. I mean the review -- the process from the review
- of the claims, to the vetting of the claims, to placing them
- 7 on the Omnibus objection and how the objection worked with
- 8 corresponding exhibits would have been identical in Omnibus
- 9 33 as it was for Omnibus 14.
- 10 Q And Debtors' Exhibit 2, your second declaration here,
- also uses the phrase "no-liability proofs of claim." Does
- 12 that have the same meaning as in Exhibit 1?
- 13 A It does.
- 14 Q And Mr. Kotarba, you reviewed one -- or the claims
- 15 investigation team, A&M and the claims evaluation team
- 16 reviewed one of Ms. Stewart's proofs of claim in connection
- 17 with the Thirty-Third Omnibus Objections.
- 18 A That's correct.
- 19 Q If you could turn to Tab 7 in your binder, sir. It's a
- 20 heavy lift there.
- 21 A It is. Okay. I'm there.
- 22 Q All right. Do you recognize this?
- 23 A Yeah, I do.
- 24 Q And what is it?
- 25 A It's Plan Number 5739.

- 1 Q Actually if -- I'd direct you back up to the top, above
- 2 that, the stamped number under the barcode.
- 3 A Oh, I apologize. Yeah, Claim Number 10982. It's the
- 4 third claim that was filed.
- 5 Q And so this is Ms. Stewart's claim, Debtors' Exhibit 7,
- 6 that was reviewed in connection with Debtors' Thirty-Third
- 7 Omnibus Objections, right?
- 8 A That's right.
- 9 Q And at a high level, can you describe the inquiry that
- 10 was performed with regard to Debtor's Exhibit 7?
- 11 A Sure. It would have been the same as we did with
- 12 respect to the other claims, in that we would take the
- 13 claim, review the claim, attempt to identify anything in the
- 14 claim that would tie to existing records that we have, to
- 15 assess the validity of the claim. We would then go back and
- 16 work with the company to elicit their further assistance to
- 17 evaluate the claim. Upon those efforts, once we realized
- 18 that there was no liability, we would then place it on the
- 19 appropriate objection.
- 20 Q All right. And that review of this particular claim,
- 21 would that have involved review of the proof of claim
- 22 itself?
- 23 A That's correct.
- 24 | Q As well as any materials that had been attached to it?
- 25 I don't know if there --

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Page 102 1 That -- I don't think there was for this one. that's correct. 3 Q Okay. (Indiscernible). 4 5 THE COURT: That is small print. 6 Okay. What did the inquiry regarding Debtors' Exhibit 7 7 reveal? 8 Similar to the other claims, we were unable to 9 ascertain any liability on behalf of the Debtors for this 10 claim. 11 I'd ask you now to turn to Debtor -- to Tab 4. And 12 just let me know when you're there. Actually, I apologize. 13 Before we get to Tab 4, go back to Debtors' Exhibit 2, we go 14 to Paragraph 5. 15 Okay. I'm at Exhibit 2. 16 Okay. In Exhibit 2, Paragraph 5, do you see, similar to your first declaration, it starts -- it indicates that, 17 18 in the second line, "The Debtors have identified 81 noliability claims listed on Exhibit 2 to Exhibit A." Do you 19 20 see that? 21 Α Yes. 22 Okay. Now if you'll turn to Tab 4. And I'll represent that this is -- on the docket at 6499-2 and it's Exhibit A 23 to the Debtor's Thirty-Third Omnibus Objection. Are you 24 25 there, sir?

Page 103 1 Yes. 2 If you could turn to Page 11 of 27, along the top. 3 Okay. I'm there. All right. And then -- and could you explain what this 4 5 shows? 6 This is Exhibit 2 to the same Exhibit A, just 7 identified, to the Thirty-Third Omnibus Objection. 8 Okay. That was referenced in Paragraph 5 of your 9 Thirty-Third Omnibus Objection? 10 That's correct. 11 Now if you can go to Page 25 of 27. 12 I'm there. 13 Okay. And then turn -- look -- direct your attention 14 to Entry 69. Can you explain what this shows? 15 Sure. Similar to the other claims, this indicates that 16 there is a no -- pending no-liability objection on the 17 Thirty-Third Omnibus Objection to the Stewart Claim 10982 18 and similar to the other claims we give the reason for 19 disallowance as no-liability. 20 Mr. Kotarba, thank you. Besides -- stepping back, 21 besides what you've already discussed with regard to the 22 Debtors' 14th and Thirty-Third Omnibus Objections and Ms. 23 Stewart's claims, are you aware of any other investigation related to Ms. Stewart's proofs of claim that are reflected 24 25 at Debtors' Exhibits 5, 6 and 7?

Page 104 1 There was one further investigation. Ms. Stewart's 2 counsel had reached out to us and propounded discovery to 3 which we prepared responses. 4 Could you please turn to Tab 8 now, sir. 5 I'm there. 6 And do you recognize this? 7 Α I do. 8 What is it? 9 These are the discover -- the list of discovery 10 requests that we received from Ms. Stewart's counsel. 11 And this -- so these were the subject of that 12 additional investigation that you mentioned? 13 That's correct. Α 14 How many requests are there, total, in here? Do you 15 know? 16 I'm checking. I believe -- I believe there was 15. 17 Okay. I want to direct you, just briefly, to a couple 18 of them in particular. First, if you please look to Request 19 for Production Number 3, which appears on Page 4 of the 20 document. 21 Okay. I'm there. 22 At a high level, can you please explain what this particular request is about and is asking for? 23 24 Sure. Really Requests 3 and 4 sort of work together. 25 And Request 3, the discovery essentially asking for us to

- 1 investigate and opine on any connections between certain
- 2 individuals and the Debtors. And then Question 4 lays out
- and asked a very similar question but attempts to find ties
- 4 between certain parcels of land and any of the Debtors.
- 5 Q Thank you. Mr. Kotarba, you're a -- as you mentioned
- 6 earlier, you're a senior member of the Debtors' claims
- 7 evaluation team, right?
- 8 A That's correct.
- 9 Q And can you tell us whether any members of the claims
- 10 evaluation team conducted any investigation in connection
- 11 | with Debtors' Exhibit 8?
- 12 A Yeah, there was extensive additional research into
- 13 compiling responses to this discovery.
- 14 Q Okay. What can you tell us, in more detail, about that
- 15 search that was done?
- 16 A Sure. We -- we were able to go back, in conjunction
- 17 with the company and their resources, essentially went back
- 18 and looked at any company systems where this information may
- 19 be recorded, any -- had conversation with any individuals
- 20 that may have knowledge of either these persons or these
- 21 parcels. And then additional research was done into third
- 22 party external sites, again, to try and -- to determine any
- 23 sort of connection between either these persons or these
- 24 parcels.
- 25 Q And when you mention third party external sites, that

Page 106 1 includes public records? 2 That's correct. How about -- what -- are you -- have anything more you 3 can tell us about the software systems that were examined? 4 There -- there was -- I know there was -- it was 5 6 an accounting software system maintained by the Land 7 Department and then there were also certain databases that 8 -- that related to current and former customers of the 9 Debtors, and Ms. Stewart had appeared as a former customer, 10 so we checked those databases as well. 11 Mr. Kotarba, what, if anything, can you tell us about the results of the investigation you just described, in 12 response to Debtors' Exhibit 8? 13 14 After those results, again, we were unable to find any 15 connection between any of the parties identified, or parcels 16 identified and the Debtors. 17 Does that include -- was -- did you find any connection 18 between the Debtors and the -- any of the property or parcels of land described? 19 20 We did not. 21 How about -- did the searches reveal anything with 22 regard to Debtors' operations that were -- purportedly 23 touched the property? We -- we didn't find any identify -- any instances of 24 25 that.

Page 107 1 And so did the investigation, in response to Debtors' 2 Exhibit 8, return any requests that were responsive to the 3 documents in any way? 4 They did not. 5 MR. GANTER: Your Honor, at this time the Debtors 6 have no further questions for Mr. Kotarba right now but 7 would ask to move the following exhibits used during the 8 direct examine into evidence, those being DX-1, DX-2 --9 well, which are already in evidence, my apologies. So it 10 would be -- right now we would move in Debtors' Exhibit 3, 11 Debtors' Exhibit 4, Debtors' Exhibit 5, Debtor's Exhibit 6, Debtor's Exhibit 7 and Debtors' Exhibit 8. 12 13 THE COURT: Any objection to the admission of 14 these documents into evidence? 15 MR. STEWART: I would object to --16 MR. SEITZ: Your Honor, just -- Your Honor, just as a point of clarification, Gary Seitz here. Is Debtors' 17 18 Exhibit 8 the request and the responses? THE COURT: I believe it is just the request. 19 20 MR. GANTER: That's correct, Your Honor, it's just the request. That were used --21 22 MR. SEITZ: I think it would be fair -- it would 23 be fair if it was both the request and the responses. MR. GANTER: That's not a problem for us, Mr. 24 25 Seitz. We can add those as an additional exhibit.

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1	THE COURT: All right. We'll add those as Exhibit
2	9 then. You can have time to put that together, obviously.
3	MR. GANTER: Okay.
4	THE COURT: Mr. Stewart, you were going to say
5	something?
6	MR. STEWART: DX I believe it's going to be DX-
7	7, you want they want to say this is a claim for Mrs.
8	Stewart. That's incorrect. On the backside of it it says
9	Kenneth Stewart, Pro Se. That was my claim. Or
10	(indiscernible)
11	THE COURT: All right. Well, the exhibit sort of
12	speaks for itself. It says what it says. And I'll take it
13	based on what it says and we can discuss what it means
14	later. But as a matter of evidence, it says what it says.
15	MR. STEWART: So what kind of search engine did
16	you use to
17	THE COURT: All right. Wait. Hang on, we're not
18	there yet.
19	MR. STEWART: Okay.
20	THE COURT: All right. So I'm going to admit
21	Documents 1 through 8 into evidence, pending 9 which will be
22	the responses.
23	MR. GANTER: Um hmm.
24	THE COURT: So admitting 8 and subject to
25	admitting 9

Page 109 1 And at this point, unless you have any further 2 questions, I'll turn the witness over for cross? MR. GANTER: No further questions. But we also 3 wanted to add, with regard to some of the filings on the 4 5 docket, that for purposes of completing the record, with 6 respect to the Stewarts' proof of claim, that we also 7 request that the Court just take notice of four other 8 filings that were on the docket related to this, just for 9 completeness of the record. 10 THE COURT: All right. 11 MR. GANTER: And those would be, they're docketed at Number 5384, Number 5716, Number 6101 and Number 6934. 12 13 THE COURT: And what are they? 14 MR. GANTER: They are -- Number 5384 is a letter 15 -- and these are -- I believe I have the exact description 16 from the docket, it's a letter and statement of facts and 17 that includes one exhibit. And this was I believe docketed 18 by Mr. Stewart. 19 THE COURT: Okay. 20 MR. GANTER: 5716 is a statement of facts 21 amendment to the statement, with additional information, 22 dated 8/25/15, again, Mr. Stewart. 23 There is a -- Entry 6101 is a letter regarding

time to hire an attorney to file an adversary dated 9/18/15,

Mr. Stewart, and then 6934 is an additional letter filed by

24

	Page 110
1	Mr. Stewart along with the exhibits. That's just for
2	completeness of the record, Your Honor.
3	THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.
4	MR. STEWART: May can I say something?
5	THE COURT: Yes, why don't you take the podium, if
6	you don't mind.
7	MR. GANTER: I'll just get out of your way.
8	MR. STEWART: On 8/18/2015 you appointed Mr.
9	Sassower to discuss with me the questions that I was asking
10	for. He did not give me any of the information that I asked
11	for. I had my family lawyer counsel ask for the same
12	information and nothing was given to him. And it was
13	appointed it was appointed that day that he was supposed
14	to disclose information to me, and it wasn't disclosed at
15	all.
16	THE COURT: Okay. Do you have questions for this
17	witness? Let's take this one step at a time.
18	MR. STEWART: In my in my in my paperwork
19	I'm I'm ready, but I just got this book at 12:00 o'clock,
20	and it's going to take me a second to pull up the easements.
21	THE COURT: Okay.
22	MR. STEWART: The easements have already been
23	entered in as a record.
24	THE COURT: They're part of what has been entered
25	into admission?

	Page 111
1	MR. STEWART: Yes, and thus my question is, if
2	they've already been entered in as a record, he should have
3	been able to find those easements and tracked it back.
4	THE COURT: All right, well you can examine him on
5	that.
6	MR. STEWART: And as a record, I went to the PUC,
7	and for some reason, they have the arm of KSU, the attorney
8	general has that information, and I put a Freedom of Request
9	in for that information, because I have the nuclear energy
10	policy for the nuclear power plant in the state of Texas.
11	THE COURT: All right, do you have any questions
12	for the witness?
13	MR. STEWART: Yes. It's going to be
14	THE COURT: Which exhibit number?
15	MR. STEWART: It's going to be Exhibit DX-6, Page
16	2 of 15. But it's really not labelled. It's going to be
17	where the pages are not numbered.
18	THE COURT: Did you say you had these documents
19	sort of separate already?
20	MR. STEWART: Yes.
21	THE COURT: We can work off that, if that's
22	easier.
23	MR. STEWART: Oh, well it's going to be okay.
24	THE COURT: If not, that's fine. We'll figure it
25	out.

	Page 112
1	MR. STEWART: It's going to say Gifco Properties,
2	it's going to be
3	THE COURT: About how far in are we?
4	MR. STEWART: Three quarters of the way in.
5	THE COURT: Okay. Can you approach it, give your
6	copy to the witness? Would that be acceptable? Maybe I can
7	actually, can you let me see it real quick, and I'll see
8	if I can find it in my own binder.
9	MR. STEWART: It's going to be 3 of 15, it's going
L O	to be on the bottom side.
L1	THE COURT: Got it. I'm there. Thank you,
L2	counsel.
L3	MR. STEWART: It's going to be the Texas Electric
L 4	Service Company.
L5	MR. KOTARBA: What page are you looking at?
L6	MR. STEWART: 3 of 15.
L 7	MR. KOTARBA: Okay.
L8	MR. STEWART: It's going to be the Texas Electric
L9	Service, TU, Texas Utilities, probably.
20	THE COURT: All right, which one?
21	MR. KOTARBA: It's going to be 3 of 15, it's going
22	to be your 6572, it's going to be the Gifco property.
23	THE COURT: Okay, what's the question?
24	Q I'm asking, does he recall researching the Texas
2 5	Heility Corvide Company?

Page 113 1 I don't have independent recollection of researching 2 this particular line, but we did research the claim, and all the supreme documentation, and were unable to determine a 3 tie between the Debtors and your claims. 4 5 It's going to be TXU Electric. 6 I'm not sure that that is --So these are all easements that are on our property. 7 8 Α Okay. 9 From Trinity River, to Montague County. 10 Where's the reference to Trinity River? 11 (Indiscernible), if you researched it, you would admit Q 12 it's right by the Trinity River, right here. 13 Α Okay. 14 So I --15 I don't know what you're asking. 16 Did you personally research this information yourself? 17 I did not personally research it, no. 18 On the next page, it's going to be Gifco Properties, 19 with the resolution. It's going to be resolution trust. 20 THE COURT: Which page? 415? 21 MR. STEWART: That's going to be 415. It's about 22 three quarters of the way down the page. You can see 23 resolution, it's going to be resolution trust. Do you see 24 that? 25 MR. KOTARBA: I don't.

	Page 114
1	MR. STEWART: It's going to be on Page 415.
2	MR. KOTARBA: Okay.
3	THE COURT: Dated February 16th, 1973, is that
4	correct?
5	MR. STEWART: Yes.
6	THE COURT: I don't see trust, but it does say
7	resolution.
8	MR. STEWART: It's resolution trust, because it's
9	how we acquired the prop or we had to save it.
LO	THE COURT: DO you see it, sir?
L1	MR. KOTARBA: I don't. I wonder if I have the
L2	same page.
L3	THE COURT: Page 415.
L4	MR. KOTARBA: Yep.
L5	THE COURT: About two-thirds down, you'll see the
L6	dates on the left. It's dated February 16th, 1973, the
L7	grantee is Gifco Prop, and then it says Doc Type Legacy
L8	Number, the word Resolution.
L9	MR. KOTARBA: Oh, got it, got it, I do.
20	THE COURT: All right, and the question then.
21	Q Do you recall going over this particular document,
22	because it's going to be all of the set track?
23	THE COURT: Do you recall going over this
24	document?
25	A I don't. Others reviewed it, and they reported back to

Page 115 1 I didn't review this individually. 2 So have you ever went over this information? So you physically went over the information that I submitted to 3 Court? 4 5 We went through your documentation, and then others at 6 my direction went through that review. I don't recall 7 individually doing this page, no. 8 I actually submit, when I realized that people weren't 9 looking at the -- it's a lot of information to take in -- I actually submitted just bits and pieces, to make it easier 10 11 on you, so you'd know what to actually look at, and you'd 12 see it. Did you ever get those papers that I faxed in, to 13 THUMG, it was about five, four pages of this specific document? 14 15 I'm not sure which fax you're referring to. I mean, I will say that we received the information that you submitted 16 17 extensively, and I was unable to find a connection. 18 Do you see a connection now, of easements, of the 19 legible easements? 20 I would have to take time to review this independently. 21 I can't make a determination from the stand. 22 Okay. I thought that was part of the discovery. THE COURT: Part of what was the discovery? 23 24 MR. STEWART: Mr. Seitz --25 I don't understand what you're asking. THE COURT:

	Page 116
1	MR. STEWART: Didn't Mr. Seitz ask for this in
2	discovery?
3	THE COURT: Mr. Seitz found in discovery who
4	did the work at A&M in response to the discovery?
5	MR. KOTARBA: We actually work with persons at the
6	Debtors.
7	THE COURT: Individuals at the Debtors themselves?
8	MR. KOTARBA: That's correct.
9	THE COURT: Where, in Irving, or?
10	MR. KOTARBA: Out at headquarters, at company
11	headquarters.
12	THE COURT: At headquarters.
13	MR. STEWART: On Page 5 of 15, do you see Texas
14	Power and Light?
15	THE COURT: Where?
16	MR. STEWART: It's going to be 5 of 15, it's on
17	the next page, it's Texas Power and Light Company, it's
18	another easement.
19	THE COURT: You mean at the very top there?
20	MR. STEWART: Yes, sir.
21	A That's correct. It's Texas P&L Co.
22	Q Texas Power and Light Company.
23	A Well, I can't be certain that that's the same.
24	Q Okay. Well, if you researched, it, you would know what
25	it stands for, wouldn't you think?

	Page 117
1	A I can't tell you from the stand what Texas A&L Co
2	stands for.
3	MR. STEWART: I don't think there's been discovery
4	done.
5	THE COURT: What do you mean?
6	MR. STEWART: I don't think that anybody's
7	actually went over and physically looked at my documents
8	that I've submitted.
9	THE COURT: Why would you say that?
10	MR. STEWART: Because they don't even know if
11	THE COURT: The man just testified that he did.
12	That he didn't personally do it, but people under his
13	direction did, in consultation with the Debtor.
14	MR. STEWART: Page 7 of 15. The Debtor can't
15	object to the information, based on discovery.
16	THE COURT: No one's objecting to the information,
17	I don't know what you're saying.
18	MR. MONTEMAYOR: The Debtor has objected to it
19	based on information that was submitted earlier, to these
20	matters, that there is no connection at all with reference
21	to what was demanded from them in the discovery, Your Honor.
22	And they said there's no connection, and there is connection
23	based on these matters here. I mean, with
24	THE COURT: Help me out. What am I looking at?
25	I'm looking at a spreadsheet, what is this?

	Page 118
1	MR. STEWART: This is going to be the property
2	THE COURT: Property search?
3	MR. STEWART: No, it's going to be Gifco
4	Properties.
5	THE COURT: But what is the document?
6	MR. STEWART: It is transactions and easements for
7	Dallas County.
8	THE COURT: All right, so this is a public
9	document that you
10	MR. STEWART: It's a public, because I did my
11	research on our property. In 1968, my father gave to the
12	Dallas County/Irving land, let them subdivide. He retained
13	all rights to the easements, and it was going to be his
14	company that did work on the easements, and I submitted that
15	document into Court today, and I am the beneficiary to that
16	680046, Page 14.
17	THE COURT: Is a couple questions for counsel
18	to the extent you know, is Texas P&L Company, is that a
19	Debtor, a predecessor to a Debtor?
20	MR. GANTZ: Your Honor, we'd have to go back and
21	check. I'm not even clear, from Mr. Stewart, whether this
22	is actually something he prepared, or a public filing. It's
23	just a question.
24	MR. STEWART: It's my research that I did on, Your
25	Honor.

Page 119 THE COURT: It's a print out a computer search, 1 2 right? You put in the word --3 MR. STEWART: No, I went to the County Records, and the 680046, Page 14, that I submitted into the docket 4 5 today, if you do research, they have it blacked out. I had 6 to go to microfiche, and get it off the computer and I had 7 it certified. 8 THE COURT: Well, I didn't look at anything that 9 you filed today. I don't know what you're talking about. 10 MR. STEWART: Okay. But some of the documents 11 that are needed, that you have to get, you'll have to go to the County for it, and search off microfiche. A lot of 12 documents that relate to the easements --13 14 THE COURT: So your claim is, what are these --15 this is one large tract of land? 16 MR. STEWART: There's going to be seven tracks of 17 land throughout the State of Texas from Montague County to 18 East Texas. 19 THE COURT: Okay, and you -- who owns that land? 20 MR. STEWART: And in Montgomery. My father and my 21 mother own that land. Now my mother owns the Montague and 22 East Texas. 23 THE COURT: She owns the land. 24 MR. STEWART: She owns what wasn't given away, 25 But he retained the rights to the easements, and --

Page 120 1 THE COURT: What do you mean he retained the rights to the easements? The right to get paid for the 2 3 easements? MR. STEWART: No, but he says, "I'm going to give 4 5 you the land. I'm going to let you subdivide -- " To 6 dedicate to the public use, the benefit (indiscernible) 7 streets. I mean, like I said, I had to pull it off 8 microfiche, it's -- "the streets, the alleys, thereon, for 9 all public use in purposes including, but not limited to, 10 all the streets and the rights of the City of Irving, and 11 assigns to the alleys and install and operate and replace 12 his drainage storm sewers, lines, gas lines, telephone 13 poles, and electrical poles. Says the easements shown on 14 the pact here above grant, dedicate, and reserve for mutual 15 16 THE COURT: Is this from what you filed this 17 morning? MR. STEWART: Yes, but we here do bind ourselves 18 to the easements, the electrical lines, anything that's on 19 20 the easements is going to be done by Stewart Company, and 21 it's been documented in 1968, because that's when we're 22 giving the land. 23 THE COURT: All right. So I'm just trying to 24 figure out your argument. So your father --25 MR. STEWART: Yes, Kenneth James Stewart.

	Page 121
1	THE COURT: Granted, or gave, or sold a bunch of
2	land to the City of Irving, Texas.
3	MR. STEWART: Dallas County.
4	THE COURT: Dallas County, all right.
5	MR. STEWART: It goes all the way up to
6	Montgomery.
7	THE COURT: And the consideration was that he
8	would do all the construction work.
9	MR. STEWART: Yes, so it would be his companies
10	that do the sewer, the power
11	THE COURT: And did that happen? Did his
12	companies actually do that work?
13	MR. STEWART: In my investigation, it sure does
14	like TXU, and Oncor, and Edison International, we have
15	claims, a large amount of claims to it.
16	THE COURT: Well, and the claim is that they
17	double-crossed you, I guess?
18	MR. STEWART: Yes, with my not this, my family
19	lawyer, Charlie B. Mitchell, which he's going to be with
20	some wind energy, with my father was one of the providers
21	on that specific document. Charlie B. Mitchell, I think was
22	with Moody Electric. I believe they're in debt. And
23	Douglas J. Brooks, with associates. And I am the associate.
24	THE COURT: Okay, all right. Do you have any
25	other questions for the witness?

Page 122 1 No, not right now. MR. STEWART: No. 2 THE COURT: Okay, redirect. 3 MR. GANTZ: Hold on one moment, Your Honor. THE COURT: Mr. Stewart? 4 5 MR. STEWART: Yes? 6 THE COURT: What's your middle -- who are you? 7 Are you Kenneth R. Stewart, are you Kenneth S. Stewart? 8 MR. STEWART: In 1994, my father put it in a red 9 folder, did not throw away, and it was my TRW from 1994, and 10 he just went back to Edison in 1995 as the ethical counsel, 11 and he was the counsel for the registrant and that -- TRW 12 states that I am Kenneth S. Stewart, AKA Robert, and TRW, 13 just for your information, is owned by Allstate. 14 Allstate, in 2007 went into an agreement with the 15 attorney general, with KKR, and I think that's where my 16 shares have been lost, or what have you. I went to the Bank 17 of the Mellons, it was 8/25/2015, after I left court. 18 I went to Syracuse, and talked to Bank of the 19 Mellons, I gave them the exact information, my TRW, gave 20 them my driver's license. I had an Oklahoma ID at the time, 21 and they said, "Well, we need something else to prove about 22 this address, " which is my mother's address. So I went and 23 got my registration out of my truck. And they said, "We're going to run the check, and we'll get back," and I submitted 24

that document as one of the proofs. They came back and

Page 123 1 said, "Kenneth S. Stewart, that --" 2 THE COURT: That's what I'm confused about. 3 trying to figure out what your name is. What's your name? 4 Your name, yeah. 5 MR. STEWART: I go by Kenneth Robert Stewart. My 6 father put it as Kenneth S., I'm not sure why. I think it 7 has something to do with England. I'm not sure, it's a code 8 of some sort. 9 THE COURT: All right. But the social security 10 numbers, I did look at that from Bank of NY Mellon. They 11 said the social security numbers didn't match, is that 12 right? 13 MR. STEWART: My social security? 14 THE COURT: I thought that's what I read. 15 MR. STEWART: I know, it said the -- I turned in 16 the Edison bond for Kenneth S. Stewart. They said it came 17 back -- I am Kenneth S. Stewart, but it came back that the 18 bond didn't match what was on the paper. Instead it went to 19 C, and then to the DTCC, and the DTCC gave it to KKR. 20 THE COURT: All right. 21 MR. STEWART: So that's where the mistake has 22 been. 23 THE COURT: Okay. Any question? 24 MR. GANTZ: No further questions, Your Honor. THE COURT: 25 All right. Thank you, sir, you may

Case 24-50459-CS6 Doc 2492 Filed 12/18/23 Page 124 of 135 Page 124 1 step down. You may be excused, if you wish. 2 MR. KOTARBA: Thank you, Your Honor. 3 THE COURT: To go have your deposition taken. 4 Stewart, do you have anything else you want to put in front of the Court? 5 6 MR. STEWART: My personal opinion, I don't think 7 they have actually done the research telling them that the 8 easements that I've submitted, or as evidence to support my 9 proof of claim. 10 THE COURT: All right. Can you flesh that out a 11 little bit, and respond to that -- this argument is, I 12 think, that the plaintiff's prima facie valid, it's your 13 burden to rebut that presumption of validity through 14 evidence. 15 Obviously you've submitted testimony today, as 16 well as representations to the Court, documents, et cetera, 17 and the argument back is, "Look, there's documents here that 18 purport to show easements in favor of Gifco," if I got it 19 right, "Property Company against what might be Debtors, or 20 predecessors to the Debtors, which might give rise to a 21 proof of claim, and how you -- what's your response to how 22 you've rebutted that presumption of validity?" If that 23 makes any sense.

Yenamandra, from K&E, on behalf of the Debtors. Just to

MS. YENAMANDRA: Your Honor, once again, Aparna

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level-set, a little bit, we did, as I noted, search for books and records before and after filing the objections.

We went through the thousands of pages of appended materials, had many of the same conversations that Your Honor had today, in an attempt to figure some of this out.

What might be some helpful context is that TXU and Oncor were originally a consolidated entity.

Post deregulation, the entity split, and the transmission lines, which seem to be at the heart of a number of the proofs of claim, went with the Oncor entity.

That might help provide, shed some light on the confusion here as to the Debtor's relationship to the allegations, and the proofs of claim.

The other thing we wanted to clarify while we were up here is with respect to the directive that Your Honor gave in response to the email Mr. Stewart sent to Mr. Sassower, from Kirkland, we understood the directive to be that Mr. Sassower, or his designee, should meet with Mr. Stewart. Mr. Husnick, who is also here, did in fact meet with Mr. Stewart, just outside, the halls.

We continued to correspond. At that time, they asked for informal discovery on all of the Debtor's corporate records, going back ad infinitum. We then understood that they retained counsel, so we started to conduct our conversations through Mr. Seitz, who then served

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the formal discovery, which we responded to, and which Your Honor has been made familiar with today.

In addition, Your Honor, Oncor's counsel has informed us that we can represent today that they did their own diligence as well, searched their books and records, and found no relationship to the land parcels, the mining operations, the transmission line allegations, the pipeline allegations in their books and records, so we believe that the fact that they did their search, we did our search appropriately addresses the potential confusion associated with TXU and Oncor originally being a consolidated entity.

THE COURT: All right, thank you. Mr. Stewart?

MR. STEWART: Who is TXU, who is Oncor?

THE COURT: TXU is --

MR. STEWART: Who's registered owner, who's --

THE COURT: Well, Oncor's owned by two entities.

Well, three entities. 80 percent owned by EFIH, which is a

18 Debtor, 20 percent is a minority holder, company called

19 Texas Transmission. Oncor's not a Debtor of this Court.

20 TXU is the business that is in the retail business of buying

21 -- of providing -- what's the word I'm looking for? It's a

22 retail servicer, or a retail provider of electrical services

23 to customers in Texas, there we go.

24 MR. STEWART: And Oncor takes care of the

25 transmission?

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Page 127 1 THE COURT: Yes, and they're a non-Debtor. 2 MR. STEWART: But they're fixing to sell the 3 asset. THE COURT: The plan that the Court confirmed 4 5 sells this control of Oncor -- well, reorganizes the control 6 of Oncor through the EFH entities, and there are new owners, 7 if you will, that are putting new money into the company 8 that will actually own that business, but it's being 9 reorganized. MR. STEWART: Yes, but I have nuclear energy 10 11 insurance on a nuclear power plant in the State of Texas, 12 and I want this to be --13 THE COURT: That would be, probably Luminant owns that. Luminant is one of the Debtors. 14 MR. STEWART: PUC told me that that's TXU. 15 16 THE COURT: Well, it used to be called TXU. 17 an alphabet soup. The whole company, all together, used to 18 be called TXU, and it was divided up into a bunch of different business units and entities, and everybody changed 19 20 their names. 21 MR. STEWART: But really, they're owned by the 22 same entity. I mean, basically it's like take it out of 23 this pocket, put it in the other pocket. Yeah. 24 But I have a policy on that, and Allstate knows 25 why I have that policy on that, and they know what the

Page 128 1 attorney general, state of Texas, and KKR, when they worked 2 a deal out in 2007 to sell off my asset or dilute my stake. THE COURT: All right. Well I have to say, I'm 3 going to rule. I'm going to grant the objection. I'm going 4 to disallow all the claims. The claims are prima facie valid 5 6 under the law. It's the burden of the Debtors to rebut that 7 presumption. They've done that through the submission of 8 evidence today that indicates that there is no connection 9 between the Debtors and any of the allegations you have 10 made. 11 I find that evidence to be credible and complete. 12 It would then shift to you to try to convince me otherwise, 13 and I've looked at your documents, I've read what you've 14 submitted to the Court, both previously, and in preparation 15 for today. So I took my binders home last night, and read 16 everything to prepared for today --17 MR. STEWART: What about what I -- oh, go ahead. 18 THE COURT: Well, you're going to submit papers to 19 the Court at 9:00 before a 9:30 hearing, they're not going 20 to be read. 21 MR. STEWART: I asked Mr. Seitz to submit them 22 last week, and he resigned.

Seitz. And Mr. Seitz, as your agent, didn't do what he was

supposed to do, then you may or may not have claims against

THE COURT: That's a question between you and Mr.

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1	him. I'm not saying you do, but the Court can't be held
2	responsible for any miscommunication between a client and
3	counsel. So I'm going to sustain the claim objection, and
4	disallow your claims. Can I have a court order?
5	MS. YENAMANDRA: Yes, Your Honor. May I approach?
6	THE COURT: Yes. Anything further for today?
7	MS. YENAMANDRA: Nothing from the Debtors, Your
8	Honor, thank you.
9	THE COURT: Thank you, we're adjourned.
10	MR. STEWART: Sir, I have to say one thing.
11	THE COURT: Yes.
12	MR. STEWART: I typed in my last four digits of my
13	social security number in your search, 5438. TXU Energy
14	came up.
15	THE COURT: Okay. I don't all right. Thank
16	you for that statement. We're adjourned.
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18	* * * *
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1	CERTIFICATION
2	
3	I, Sonya Ledanski Hyde, certified that the foregoing
4	transcript is a true and accurate record of the proceedings.
5	Sonya Digitally signed by Sonya Ledanski Hvde
6	Ledanski DN: cn=Sonya Ledanski Hyde, o=Veritext, ou, emill=Edigital@veritext.com,
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8	Sonya Ledanski Hyde
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23	Mineola, NY 11501
24	
25	Date: December 17, 2015

Case 2345049793CCS DDoc214207-File File 2/118/2138/19 age alog 231061.35

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT District of Delaware 824 Market Street, 3rd Floor Wilmington, DE 19801

In Re:

Energy Future Holdings Corp. Energy Plaza

1601 Bryan Street

Dallas, TX 75201

EIN: 46–2488810 TXU Corp.

TXU Corp Texas Utilities Chapter: 11

Case No.: 14-10979-CSS

NOTICE OF FILING OF TRANSCRIPT AND OF DEADLINES RELATED TO RESTRICTION AND REDACTION

A transcript of the proceeding held on 12/16/2015 was filed on 12/18/2015. The following deadlines apply:

The parties have 7 days to file with the court a *Notice of Intent to Request Redaction* of this transcript. The deadline for filing a *request for redaction* is 1/8/2016.

If a request for redaction is filed, the redacted transcript is due 1/19/2016.

If no such notice is filed, the transcript may be made available for remote electronic access upon expiration of the restriction period, which is 3/17/2016 unless extended by court order.

To review the transcript for redaction purposes, you may purchase a copy from the transcriber (see docket for Transcriber's information) or you may view the document at the clerk's office public terminal.

David D. Bird, Clerk of Court

Date: 12/18/15

(ntc)

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